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REMARKS

ON

DR WARE'S ANSWER.

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The first edition of Dr Woods's REPLY was published Sept. 1821. In May, 1822, Dr Ware published an ANSWER. The principal points in this ANSWER are noticed in the following REMARKS.

REMARKS.

THE design of this pamphlet is to make a few remarks on Dr Ware's Answer to my Reply. As this discussion has been already carried to a great length, and as I am unwilling to burden the patience, or abuse the candor, either of my opponent or of the public; I shall confine my remarks to those parts of the subject which appear most important, aiming to be as concise as possible, consistently with doing any degree of justice to what I believe to be the cause of truth.

The system of divine truth, emanating from the mind of God, and agreeing with his immutable perfections, must be consistent with itself. But in every erroneous system, there are *inconsistencies*. Some of these arise from the union in the same system of different and opposite forms of error; but a greater number arise from the mixture of certain portions of truth with error. In order that any system of error may have a plausible appearance and an extensive circulation, it is found indispensable that it should contain a considerable portion of truth, sufficient at least to afford some satisfaction to reason and some relief to conscience. But however skilfully truth may be mixed with error, and whatever plausibility may be given to a system of error by the truths which lie on its surface; it will always be found that such a mixture occasions a variety of inconsistencies which no art can long conceal.

I consider the general scheme of doctrine held by Unitarians,

as radically erroneous. And yet, as it is exhibited by my antagonist, and by all other Unitarians, it asserts many and very important truths. This circumstance, though in one point of view it becomes a recommendation of Unitarianism, really occasions an abundance of those inconsistencies with which the scheme is encumbered. The inconsistencies so apparent in Dr Ware's reasoning are, in my opinion, to be charged to the scheme itself. They are inseparable from it. No man, I think, can undertake its defence, without finding himself entangled in an endless train of self-contradictions.

Dr Ware signifies that "the apparent inconsistencies and absurdities" which have been "fastened" upon him, do not affect "the truth of the points at issue;" that they show, "not the weakness of the cause, but that its strength has not been fully displayed;" and that they are, "in general, if not in every instance, apparent only." He lets us know, in several places, that he thinks more highly of Unitarianism, than of his own skill in defending it, and rather chooses that any reproach should fall upon him, as a disputant, than upon his cause. But on all these points, my views and feelings are different from his. And in particular, it is my serious conviction, that the inconsistencies and absurdities which were pointed out in my Reply, are real; that they affect the truth of the points at issue; and that Dr Ware's Answer, instead of removing them, adds to their number.

I now proceed, though with all due respect for the good sense and good temper of my opponent, to offer the following remarks upon what appears to me exceptionable in his publications, particularly the last.

USE OF THE WORDS INNOCENCE AND PURITY.

There can be no doubt or difficulty in regard to the meaning of these terms, if we consider the subject to which they are in any case applied, and keep in mind the proper standard of judging. But on this point, I have little to add to what I said in my Reply. We sometimes give the name of innocence to the harmlessness of certain animals, meaning surely nothing of moral nature. When a man is free from particular crimes laid to his charge, we say, he is *innocent*, that is, in respect to those particular crimes. But

when *innocence* or *purity* is attributed to man, considered as a moral agent, and under obligations to obey the divine law, nothing can be meant but *holiness*. Nothing short of this can be regarded as *innocence* or *purity*, in relation to such a subject. But this is the subject and the only subject with which we are concerned in this discussion; and it is the subject to which the word generally relates, as used in the Scriptures. Now let us see in what sense Dr Ware uses the word *innocence* or *purity* in relation to this very subject. He says, human beings come into existence "*innocent, or pure.*" He shows what he means, when in the same general statement, he represents them as "without any greater bias to sin than to holiness; as no more inclined to vice than to virtue." It is clearly implied, that they are *innocent*, though really inclined to vice, if they are no more inclined to it, than to virtue. He says in his Answer, his object was to prove that man by nature is "*innocent, not totally depraved.*" It seems then, as he plainly shows afterwards, that *innocence*, in his sense of the word, belongs to those who, in a moral and religious view, have a *mixed* character, provided there is not in the mixture a greater quantity of evil, than of good. Now this representation, compared with what Dr Ware advances in his Letters, pp. 24, 25, would lead to the conclusion, that men in general, yea, the worst of men, are *innocent*; and that, in this respect, there is no essential difference between them and little children. For he says "that in by far the largest part of human beings, the just, and kind, and benevolent dispositions prevail beyond measure over the opposite; and that even in the worst men, good feelings and principles are predominant, and they probably perform in the course of their lives many more good, than bad actions." If it is then Dr Ware's opinion of men in general, and even of the worst, that they are "not totally depraved," and are "no more inclined to vice than to virtue;" he must of course consider them all as *innocent*.

If my readers should think I must be mistaken as to the real meaning of Dr Ware, let them look at his Answer, p. 9, and they will see that he does actually attribute to those whom he calls *innocent*, just such a mixture of virtue and vice. After laying down his position "that human beings come into existence *innocent*, and without any greater bias to sin than to holiness; not inclined to holiness only, nor to holiness more than to sin," he says; "if this

be the truth, the earliest indications of character will be of a *mixed* nature; and at an early period, as soon indeed as the child becomes capable of moral action, we shall be likely to find in its dispositions and in its character, *as much* of that which is good as that which is evil." This is brought forward as an exhibition in early life of *that very innocence*, which he says belongs to human beings at first. That he means to ascribe innocence to those, who exhibit this mixture of good and evil, is perfectly manifest from his Letters, p. 26, and else-where, and from his Answer, p. 10. Here he reminds us, that when he had occasion to speak of the good dispositions of children, that is, of their *innocence, purity, simplicity, &c.* he meant, not that they are *holy* by nature, but that they are *not totally depraved*. And as he asserts of *all men*, that they are *not totally depraved*, but have a preponderance of good; he must, to be consistent, regard them all as *innocent* and *pure*.

I think, however, that the sense in which Dr Ware seems here to use the word *innocence*, is different from that in which it has commonly been used by those who deny native depravity. When they assert the natural innocence of man, they mean that he is *free from every moral taint, entirely free* from sinful propensity, and not that he is of a *mixed* character. It is plain that this was the prevailing sense of Dr Ware himself, in his first publication. He says that "man is by nature *innocent* and *pure, free from all moral corruption.*" But now he tells us abundantly, that when he speaks of the characteristics of children, and of the earliest indications of their disposition and character, he means to prove *only* that they are *not totally depraved*; clearly implying that, though they are *partially* depraved, and exhibit a *mixed* character, they are still *innocent*;—*innocent*, though inclined to *vice* as much as to *virtue*; *pure*, though *partly polluted*; *pure* in a *mixed* sense, having as much of good as of evil, and as much of evil as of good.

I hope that Dr Ware, on a careful review, will be convinced, that there is some radical error in a system which leads him into so many stray paths, and involves him thus in greater and greater difficulties. How must it appear to the reader, and how must it appear to Dr Ware himself, to find, that he has spoken of the *innocence* and *purity* of those who have a *mixed* character;—the *innocence* and *purity* of *the very worst of men*, because, as he thinks, though they are inclined to *vice*, they are no more inclined to *vice*

than to virtue. In his reasoning on this subject, he seems to have forgotten, that man, as a moral agent, is under obligation perfectly to obey the law of God, and that he never can be considered as completely *innocent* and *pure*, unless he yields the whole obedience which is required; nor in any degree *innocent* and *pure*, without some degree of holy obedience.

Dr Ware will perceive what strange inconsistencies attend his use of words, when he looks over some of his pages, and finds that he has expressly asserted the necessity of *regeneration* for those who are, in his view, *innocent* and *pure*. It is one of his positions, that those very beings whom he denominates *innocent* and *pure*, have not that holiness which is necessary to their being Christians, and therefore that they must be born again! He frequently suggests that the *innocence*, *purity*, and *simplicity* of little children are not *moral* qualities, that they imply no holiness and no moral character. But in his Answer, pp. 14, 15, he shows himself quite dissatisfied with the same suggestion in my Reply. I had endeavoured to show that what Christ says of children does not imply that they have "any moral excellence, like the moral excellence of Christians," and that the amiable qualities belonging to them, as innocence, purity, &c. are *natural*, not *moral* qualities. His whole argument in opposition to this implies, that the good qualities of children, their innocence, purity, &c. must be *moral* qualities, like the moral qualities peculiar to Christians. In short, he seems to say, they are moral qualities, or they are not, just as the different and clashing parts of his system happen to require. I attribute this, not to any intention of his, but to the perplexity in which he is involved by the defence of his system.

This confusion in the use of words might have been prevented, had Dr Ware fixed in his mind, that the divine law is the standard of moral good, and then carefully inquired whether the qualities of human nature referred to, are what that law requires. But he seems to have turned off his eye from this simple and perfect standard, and to have framed his whole argument on other principles.

USE OF THE WORD HOLINESS.

Divines and all Christians, so far as I know, use the word *holiness* to denote *moral excellence*, or conformity to the law of God. This is its *common* as well as its *technical* sense. But in his Answer, p. 13, Dr Ware informs us that he did not mean to use it in this sense. Let us inquire how he does use it. In his Letters he says: "If children are depraved, *destitute of holiness*, averse to all good, &c. how could our Savior declare respecting them, *of such is the kingdom of God.*" This, which Dr Ware now looks upon as an "unlucky" passage, I considered as clearly signifying that children are *not destitute of holiness*, and so as contradicting what he says his scheme every where implies, namely, *that men by nature do not possess personal holiness*. In answer to this, he very frankly says, if we will insist that he must have used the word *holiness* in its technical sense, the charge of inconsistency will lie against him. I would be far from taking any advantage of an "unlucky phrase," which he used inadvertently, and now reviews with regret. I am willing to admit any explanations, and to understand the word *holiness*, as he would have me understand it. As he used the word in his Letters, p. 30, it must have denoted that holiness, which is a qualification for heaven. His argument required this. He now allows, p. 13, that he "used a phrase which expresses a meaning, that he did not intend to express." He plainly signifies that by holiness he did not mean holiness. He tells us finally, that "the sense, whether proper or improper, in which the word was evidently used, implies no contradiction." But I still have a difficulty in getting at a consistent sense. For if by holiness he does not mean holiness, but something else; he does indeed avoid one contradiction,—the one upon which he particularly had his eye; but in avoiding this, he runs upon others. For immediately after, p. 14, he labors to establish a position directly contrary to what he says his main position was in regard to the very subject. In my Reply I considered the passage, Matt. xix. 24, as *not* implying "that little children possess any moral excellence or goodness like that of Christians." He here opposes this opinion. He adduces several arguments against it; and, in the whole course of his remarks, endeavours to show, that the amiable qualities of children, so often mentioned, are *moral* qualities.

and that the *innocence, purity, veracity, &c.* which appear in them, are of the same nature with those attributes of Christians which are denoted by the same names, and of course, that they have real *moral excellence, or goodness.* Or more briefly thus. In p. 13, he says, he never meant to assert, that children have any holiness "in the technical sense." But in p. 14, he expressly tells us, they have "good qualities." Now if by "good qualities," he means *holiness in the technical sense,* that is, the moral excellence which prepares men for heaven, there is a plain contradiction. If he does not mean this, he means nothing which is pertinent to the argument. But after all, it is evident he does mean holiness in the technical sense. For his whole reasoning, pp. 14, 36, requires this. And besides, he gives his opinion, p. 11, that those same good qualities of children make "a part, and an important part of that character, which constitutes *conformity to the moral law,* and renders him to whom it belongs *holy.*" This is surely saying, that, children have that which is of the nature of *holiness.* And again in the same page, he comes near charging me with confounding "physical and moral qualities," and agreeing with Hume and Godwin, because I contended that the natural qualities of children have nothing in them of a moral nature, and nothing like the moral excellence of Christians. Here again we see that, according to the plain import of Dr Ware's expressions, little children naturally possess real holiness. If this is not his opinion, he will, I apprehend, think it proper to acknowledge, that in his last publication, as well as the former, he has occasionally used an "unlucky phrase." And, if I mistake not, he always will use unlucky phrases, and run into palpable inconsistencies in his reasoning, so long as he labors to defend a scheme of religion, which measures moral character and actions by any rule, except the perfect law of God. The fault is evidently in his religious system; and while he adheres to that, he must find difficulties unavoidable.

One more remark. It seems to me that the whole controversy, as Dr Ware conducts it, turns very much on this single word, and that what gives his reasoning at first view, such an appearance of plausibility, is the wonderful facility with which this word, *holiness,* continually shifts its meaning. If human nature is to be described in opposition to the Orthodox doctrine of depravity,

a variety of amiable and excellent qualities are attributed to it, and the whole train of thought and drift of reasoning imply, that children have that moral purity or holiness, which makes them like real Christians, and fits them for the kingdom of heaven. But if this representation is to be reconciled with other acknowledged principles, particularly with the necessity of regeneration asserted by our Savior; then the whole subject puts itself into a new attitude; the amiable qualities of children are not of a moral nature; they do not constitute personal holiness, or positive virtue; and those who possess them must be born again before they can be qualified for the kingdom of heaven.

DR WARE'S MAIN POINT ON THE SUBJECT OF DEPRAVITY.

Dr Ware often asserts in his Answer, that the question at issue between us is not whether man is by nature the subject of some degree of depravity, but whether he is *totally depraved*. To this statement of the subject I have no objection; and am willing to understand him as directing his argument from the natural characteristics of children, against the doctrine of *total depravity*. But what is the doctrine of total depravity? It is, *that man is by nature wholly destitute of holiness, and that all his moral affections and actions are sinful*. The doctrine allows that man has by nature many appetites, passions, and affections, which are not *sinful*, being not of a moral nature. I said expressly in my Reply, that the amiable qualities of children, which Dr Ware makes so much of, are no part and no indication of depravity. But I must say too, they are *not holiness*. And if this can be made to appear, the controversy is ended. For our doctrine of *total* sinfulness does not imply, that sinfulness is mixed with no other dispositions or affections whatever. It only implies that it is mixed with none which are *holy*. It admits that moral depravity in man may be mixed with any thing but real *holiness*. It excludes none of the qualities ever found in those who are destitute of holiness, whether children or men.

The whole force of Dr Ware's argument against total depravity lies in "the amiable traits and virtuous tendencies" of children. The only question is, whether these amiable traits are *holy*. If they are, they disprove our doctrine. If they are not holy,

they do not disprove it. Now I could quote a multitude of passages from Dr Ware's two publications, which assert or imply that those things which he mentions as belonging to children, are not *holy*. And I could prove the same thing, and I think it has already been proved, from the word of God. If then any one supposes that Dr Ware's argument above mentioned, is valid, it must be because he misapprehends the Orthodox doctrine, or the nature of the argument. Dr Ware thinks it a singular concession for an Orthodox man to make, "that beings destitute of all good and inclined only to evil," are yet by nature possessed of those amiable qualities which are called innocence, kindness, gratitude, &c. But it will cease to appear singular, if he will only take into view, first, that our doctrine respects man's moral affections, or his moral and religious character merely; and secondly, that the amiable qualities of childhood, by whatever name they may be called, constitute no part of moral and religious character, and of course make no mixture which our doctrine denies.

Dr Ware's answer, Lett. I. and II, contains a great variety of passages, on which I should freely animadvert, were it not inconsistent with the limits I have prescribed to myself in this Pamphlet, and were it not perfectly easy for the intelligent reader to see what influence the remarks already made, must have upon every thing there offered against the Orthodox doctrine.

The suggestion of Dr Ware at the close of Lett. II. is of a practical nature, and ought not to pass unnoticed. He says, "If parents find it impossible to persuade their children to love, fear, and obey God, &c. they are certainly called upon to examine most seriously, whether the cause of it is not to be found in the representations which have been given them of the character and government of God."

I admit that they ought to inquire. But if it should be found that the more *truly* and *faithfully* the character and government of God are represented, the more distant is the human heart from love and obedience; it would be nothing different from what occurred under the personal ministry of Christ.

DR WARE'S ATTEMPT TO SHOW THAT DEPRAVITY IS NOT INNATE.

I endeavoured to make it appear, in my Reply, Chap. III, that

all the circumstances which lead us to consider any property of man as *natural* or *innate*, manifestly attend moral depravity. I shall remark, in few words, on the manner in which Dr Ware attempts to prove my reasoning inconclusive.

The first circumstance of human depravity which I mentioned as proving it to be natural, was its *universality*. Dr Ware thinks it is not true that all have sinned in such a sense "*as implies a character.*" "No reason," he says, "can be assigned, why a single sin should constitute a sinner, any more than a single act of virtue should give the character of a virtuous man;" and then proceeds to express the same views as before, respecting the mixed character of every human being.

On this I offer the following remarks. The divine law is perfect, and treats all its subjects according to what their characters really are. If that law pronounces any human being to be a *sinner*, and aims its threats against him, *as a sinner*; we are surely to consider him as having, in reality, the *character* of a sinner. Now what does the law say? "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." Is it said, that a single sin does not constitute a *sinner* in the sense of the divine law? But the apostle says, "he who offends in one point, is guilty of all;" which must imply at least, that he, who commits a single sin, shows that he has the *character of a sinner*, and must be treated by the law as a sinner. How is it in regard to the civil law, which prohibits murder on the penalty of death? If a man, from malice and revenge, deliberately commits an act of murder; does not that one act expose him to be treated as a *murderer*? And unless he gives good evidence of a thorough reformation, does not that one act give him, and permanently too, the *character* of a murderer? Dr Ware, in his remarks on this point, has his eye upon the same mixture of qualities, so often mentioned above. But it must be remembered, that it is a mixture, of which *holiness* has not been proved to constitute any part. This applies also to his remarks on the second circumstance mentioned in my Reply; namely, that *the indications of depravity appear early*. He says there are other things of an opposite character, which appear early too, referring still to the same amiable characteristics of childhood. But those characteristics, however amiable and useful, cannot be proved to be of a moral nature, or to constitute any degree of conformity to God's

law. It is true, the want or extinction of them, arising as it must from an extraordinary degree of wickedness, will form an article in the catalogue of sins; and so would the extinction of any of the natural appetites or faculties, if it should result from the same cause. But because the extinction of any natural appetite or faculty of man by means of moral corruption, is to be accounted as a sin; it does not surely follow that the *existence* of that appetite or faculty is to be accounted holiness.

Another circumstance which I mentioned as distinguishing those things which are *innate*, was, that "they cannot be traced to any change in the constitution of man's nature subsequent to his birth." Dr Ware says, "the whole reasoning of Dr Woods on the subject proceeds on the supposition, either that I had asserted, or that the doctrine which I advanced did imply, such a change. You will therefore be not a little surprised to find, that no such change in the constitution of our nature is either asserted or implied in all that I have said." Now let us see what is asserted or implied in Dr Ware's Letters. In page 27, speaking of some of the amiable dispositions of little children, he says; "what I have stated, I am persuaded is the general character, *until the disposition and tendency of nature has been changed* by education, example, and circumstances." It is here implied that the corruption of character, which after a while appears in children, is to be accounted for by a *change* which education, example and circumstances produce *in the disposition and tendency of their nature*. And yet he thinks that no such change is *either asserted or implied* in all that he has said. In his explanation, Answer, p. 32, he signifies that when he speaks of a change in the disposition and tendency of nature, he must be understood to mean something quite different from a change in the moral constitution of man, or a change in his nature. But he does not tell us nor attempt to tell us what he does mean, nor what distinction can be made between "a change in the *constitution of man's nature*," and "a change in the *disposition and tendency of nature*."—But without any reference to what Dr Ware had said respecting a change of nature or of moral constitution, it was quite to my purpose to prove depravity to be native, by the consideration, that it is not owing to any change of nature subsequent to birth. For clearly, if mankind are depraved, as Dr Ware allows, and if depravity is not

owing to any change of moral constitution or character subsequent to their birth, their depravity must be *native*.

The fourth circumstance I mentioned to show that depravity is native, was, that it is *spontaneous*. Dr Ware, p. 33, adverts immediately to the same amiable affections of children, and asks, whether they are not *spontaneous also*. I have said already that they are. But they are not moral qualities, and have not a holy character, and cannot be alleged as proofs of natural holiness, or of any thing contrary to our doctrine of native depravity.

The next reason which I gave for thinking moral evil *natural*, was, "that it is hard to be eradicated." Dr Ware's reply is, "that the same may be said with equal truth of the good affections and principles of our nature." I acknowledge it and have before acknowledged it to be so, with respect to what he calls the good affections and principles of our nature. Those amiable qualities have all the marks of being natural. In this we are agreed. But I cannot agree with him, if he so far forgets himself as to consider them to be either holiness, or indications of holiness.

My sixth reason was *the certainty that every child born into the world will be a sinner*. Dr Ware replies thus. "If the word *sinner* is here used as a designation of character, and it be intended to assert that the prevailing disposition, affections &c. will universally be sinful, it is not true." On this subject I am well aware that we are too far apart to reason together, with any prospect of coming to the same conclusion. For my opponent denies not only that all men, but that any men, however bad, have a prevalence of sinful dispositions. If he is right, there is a preponderance of moral good in all. And if I should admit this, I should adopt the same conclusion as he does respecting man's natural character. Dr Ware thinks a paragraph which I wrote on this subject implies, that the Orthodox wish to prove merely, "that sin is natural to man in the same sense that *holiness* is." "If this is the case," he says, "there is no need of controversy." But this is not exactly the case. I maintain that sin is natural to man in the same sense and only in the same sense with those appetites and affections which Dr Ware *calls* holiness. But what he calls holiness would be something quite different according to our standard.

CONSISTENCY OF DEPRAVITY WITH THE MORAL CHARACTER OF GOD.

On this subject I have but few additional remarks to make. In my Reply, p. 62, I mentioned it as a particular fault in the mode of reasoning adopted by Unitarians, "that they consider a difficulty which they are not able to solve, as sufficient to disprove a doctrine, supported by clear and conclusive evidence." Dr Ware seems to wish me "to refer to the book and page where such an assertion is to be found." I acknowledge I can refer to no book where Unitarians avow this principle in so many words. Nor is it probable they would do this, as it would be in fact the same as to own themselves guilty of a great fault in reasoning. But I could refer to many a book, and particularly to the one to which I have offered a reply, and to the part of it which relates to this very subject, as exhibiting the very mode of reasoning here complained of. The evidence which supports the doctrine of natural depravity is, in my view, clear and conclusive; and I think it would be so in Dr Ware's view, were it not for certain difficulties, which he is not able to solve. Those difficulties are manifestly considered by him as sufficient to disprove the doctrine. Be sure, he would not, in this state of mind, say that the evidence in support of the doctrine is clear and conclusive. And why? Not because there is really any defect in *the evidence*, but because he suffers the difficulties so to influence his mind, as entirely to prevent him from feeling the weight of evidence. This is what often occurs in regard to the most important subjects in Ethics and Theology. Men acquire a habit of looking more at the various difficulties which attend moral and religious truth, than at the substantial evidence which supports it. In consequence of this habit, that evidence which, in other circumstances, would appear perfectly clear and conclusive, loses in their minds all its clearness and force. Thus it is in fact the consideration of *difficulties*, which leads them to reject the truth. This is a fault in the habit of mind which Dr Ware has doubtless had occasion to notice, and which must be considered very hazardous to the cause of truth. For there is really no doctrine in Christianity or in natural theology, which is not attended with difficulties. And we learn from the case of Hume and many others, and we may perhaps confirm

the lesson by some portions of our own experience, that there may be such a habit of dwelling upon difficulties in relation to any subject whatever, as will be likely to end in a skeptical state of mind, if not in a decided rejection of the truth. It appears evident to me, that something like what I have now described, has had a great effect upon the reasoning and faith of Unitarians, in regard to the subjects of the present controversy.

Dr Ware, p. 41, objects to my leaving naked *suppositions*, on the ground of which natural depravity and divine goodness may be made to appear consistent. As to this I beg leave to say, that, although his asserting the impossibility of our making any such supposition, was a sufficient reason why I should show that a supposition of that kind could be made; yet I did not, as he intimates, leave naked suppositions, without offering any proof. It will be seen in chap. 4. that I first exhibited a probable solution of the difficulty which Dr Ware had suggested, as to the consistency of depravity with the divine attributes, and then proceeded expressly to show, by several facts, that the solution I had given was conformable to truth, and ought to be satisfactory. It cannot be necessary that I should repeat here what I offered in that chapter. I would merely request the reader to see for himself, whether I left the subject as Dr Ware's remarks seem to imply.

I am charged with evading the point at issue, and confounding the *beginning* of sin with its *origin*; things which Dr Ware considers as very different. He says "the question is not *at what time*, whether earlier or later, the commencement of sin may be consistent with the moral perfections of God; but whether its originating in a nature wholly corrupt, in natural affections wholly wrong, and an inclination only to evil, in connexion with the other doctrines of Calvinism——be consistent?" Dr Ware has indeed a right to introduce a question in such a general and complex form. But it is not the form in which I have ever attempted to discuss it, or in which it is capable of discussion. The method which I have adopted, and I think it the only one which in any such case promises success, is, to take up convenient parts of the whole complex subject, and discuss them first separately, then in their relations to each other. In the present case, I inquire first, whether the Orthodox doctrine of depravity is consistent with the divine attributes. After that I proceed to inquire, whether the doctrine of

Election is consistent; then the doctrine of divine influence, and the doctrine of endless punishment. If I find nothing in the several parts which constitute the system, and nothing in their relation to each other, inconsistent with the divine perfections, I conclude there is nothing inconsistent in the whole system. And I maintain that we cannot properly discuss any complex subject, without thus analyzing it, and considering its constituent parts by themselves.

The present question is, whether sin's "originating in a nature wholly corrupt, in natural affections wholly wrong, and an inclination only to evil," is consistent with the divine attributes. But what is a corrupt nature? What are wrong affections? What is an inclination to evil? Are these any thing but sin? When Dr Ware speaks of the *source* or *origin* of sin as something distinct from *sin itself*; if he means the outward act of sin, or visible transgression merely, the distinction he makes is very proper. Outward, visible sin springs from inward sin; sin in the life from sin in the heart. But sin in its highest sense is *sin in the heart*, that is, *wrong affection, corrupt inclination*. There cannot then be any doubt, that sin originates in wrong affection, or a nature morally corrupt. For it is perfectly obvious it can originate no where else. It is impossible to form a conception of such a thing as sin, which does not begin in the heart, or in moral inclination or affection. So that no man can make a distinction that is intelligible, between that which in the most proper sense is *sin*, and *corrupt affection* or *inclination*. Now the question, whether sinfulness or depravity is *innate*, is, in my view, the same as the question, whether it is coeval with man's moral existence, or whether it belongs to his moral nature from the first? And this is the same as the question, *at what time*, whether at the beginning of man's existence, or afterwards, sin commences? I can see no other meaning in the question as to *native depravity*. Our doctrine is, that sin or moral evil belongs to man from the first, in distinction from the doctrine that man is at his first existence free from sin, and that sin takes place, or that depravity commences, afterwards. This, I think, will be found to be the only fair meaning of the language which has commonly been used on the subject. Accordingly, I am persuaded, that in my reasoning in chap. IV. I am not chargeable with any

evasion of the point at issue. Sin exists. The question is, when does it commence? We say it is found in man at the beginning of his moral existence, or that he is sinful from the first. Unitarians say, man is at first *pure*, and afterwards, by the abuse of his faculties, becomes a sinner. The difference respects the time when sin commences. I know there is a further difference as to the degree of sinfulness. But this is distinct from the other.—From this view of sin, or depravity, as to the time of commencement, I proceed to show that whether sin begins earlier or later in the human character, it stands in the same relation to God; and so conclude that the whole comes at last to the single inquiry, whether the existence of moral evil generally is consistent with the divine attributes;—and whether its existing in a higher degree may not be as consistent, as its existing in a lower degree. Here the subject is brought into day light; and we reason upon facts and principles which are indisputable.

Now if Dr Ware has supposed that the Orthodox doctrine of depravity is any thing different from this position, namely, that moral evil in man commences at the very time when moral existence commences; I will only say, that this is what I have intended by it, and that it is in this light only I have undertaken to defend it. Let then the controversy, so far as I am concerned, be thus understood. There is frequently some confusion or difficulty attending the discussion of this part of the subject, from considering the phrases, *corruption of nature, wrong affection or inclination, tendency to evil*, &c. as meaning something which is not *sin*, and for which man is not *blame-worthy*. If such phrases are used in any intelligible sense, they must mean the real existence of *sin* or *moral evil* in the human character; sin in the heart, forbidden by the divine law, and altogether blame-worthy and without excuse. They must be understood to mean substantially all that constitutes sin, when they are applied to human beings at the commencement of their moral existence, as much as at any subsequent period. It is surely sin for men to have a corrupt heart, or an inclination or tendency to transgress the divine law. And if this is sin at one period of human existence, why not at another? These remarks are sufficient to show, that the proper question at issue is, *at what time moral evil commences in man.*

DR WARE'S REMARKS AS TO THE COMMON USE OF THE TERMS SIN
AND HOLINESS, SINNERS AND SAINTS, REGENERATE AND UNRE-
GENERATE.

In his Reply, p. 44, Dr Ware says; "your impression taken from the common use of these terms is, that sin and holiness are not only opposites, but opposites in such a sense, that they can never exist together in the same person." He says, it is "in conformity with this distinction, that all mankind are divided into two classes,—saints and sinners; the former wholly righteous, the latter totally corrupt." And this use of terms is, a little after, expressly attributed to the Orthodox. But there is not an Orthodox man in the world that either believes this, or ever said any thing that implies it. The distinction which the Orthodox have uniformly made between saints and sinners, is, that the former have *some holiness*, mixed with *much remaining sin*; while the latter are *destitute of holiness*, and so far as moral affection is concerned, entirely sinful. Thus we make a real and obvious distinction, and one which seems to us to be very clearly made in the word of God. But Unitarians affirm that sinners, as well as saints, have a degree of holiness mixed with sin, and so leave no room for any radical distinction between them. If Dr Ware should say that saints are distinguished from sinners, in that they have a preponderance of holiness over sin; he will find that he has precluded this distinction by saying that sinners have the same preponderance.

STATE OF ADAM'S POSTERITY IN CONSEQUENCE OF HIS TRANSGRESSION.

Dr Ware says, p. 52, that the descendants of the first transgressor "commence their existence under circumstances of increased liability to sin, and greater difficulty in preserving their innocency.—Occasions of sin are multiplied, and inducements to it increased and strengthened." And he adds, "that any individual of his posterity will be far more likely, than he was, to lose his innocence," and that "there may be what we term a moral certainty" of this. I introduce this passage to show that Dr Ware's scheme is encumbered with as many and as great difficulties as

ours, whether we consider it in relation to God's attributes, or to moral agency. Dr Ware thinks it inconsistent with the infinite goodness of the Creator to bring human beings into existence in such a state, that they will from the first have an inclination or tendency to sin, or which is the same thing, a nature morally corrupt. He thinks this inconsistent with moral agency also. But does he see no difficulty in believing that the benevolent Creator brings his creatures into existence in a state, in which they are under such a strong liability to sin,—in which occasions of sin are so multiplied and inducements so increased, that there is a moral certainty they will all lose their innocence? Should we not naturally expect that a being of infinite goodness would place his creatures in a different state?—or, if he placed them in such a state, that he would afford some effectual security against its dangers? And are not those external inducements to sin, which have such strength that it is morally *certain* they will actually draw men universally into sin, as hard to be reconciled with moral agency, as what the Orthodox suppose?

MISREPRESENTATION OF THE ORTHODOX DOCTRINE AS TO
THE NATURAL STATE OF MAN.

In p. 8. of his Answer, Dr Ware represents the Orthodox doctrine to be this; "That man is by nature totally depraved, inclined only to evil, and wholly *incapable* of any good inclination or motion, until such inclination or motion is produced by an *irresistible* act of the Spirit of God."—This Dr Ware inserts with the marks of quotation, as though the language had been used by me, or by some other Orthodox writer. Again, p 41. we find Orthodoxy represented as teaching, that man is by nature "*incapable* of having a good thought, affection, or inclination, without an influence of the Spirit which he can do nothing to obtain." And again, p. 43, "that men are utterly *incapable* of thinking or feeling otherwise than they do think and feel." Now I did hope, after all that had been written on this subject, that Dr Ware would never again invest Orthodoxy with such false colors. As to human *power, capacity* or *ability*, understood in the proper sense, our conceptions are at least as high, as those of our opponents. Man has, in our view, a *capability* or *power* of doing all that God

requires of him. His power must, we think, be as extensive as his duty. We constantly assert that the fault of man is not want of *power* to do his duty, but of *disposition* or *inclination*. So that any prejudice which is excited against Orthodoxy in the minds of the learned or the vulgar by such representations as those above mentioned, is excited at the expense of candor and truth. If Unitarians really think that the representation we make of our own doctrine is tantamount to the one which they are so fond of substituting in its place, why will they not be content to make use of ours? If it is not tantamount, then what apology can they have for putting theirs in its place? I mean these remarks should apply also to the manner in which Unitarians use the words *arbitrary*, *irresistible*, &c. when they undertake to describe our views of divine grace in man's conversion. It is certainly a reasonable request which we make, that, whenever they give a representation of our faith, they would do us the justice to use our language, and that they would affix to it the same sense which we do.

Another misrepresentation of our doctrine is found p. 56, where Dr Ware says; "If we are by nature totally depraved, inclined wholly to evil, every affection and action wrong; what room is there for becoming more and more sinful?" This is the same as to say, the Orthodox doctrine implies not only that all the affections and actions of the unregenerate are sinful without any mixture of *holiness*, but that they are sinful in the *highest possible degree*. Whereas it is the uniform opinion of the Orthodox, and an opinion which plainly results from every right view of the philosophy of the mind, that all the affections, whether sinful or holy, are capable of continual increase, and that ordinarily, whatever excites them to vigorous exercise, actually increases their strength. With what reason then can Dr Ware affirm, that if we are "wholly sinful at first, any change to which we are subject, must be to a *less* sinful state, since there would be an impossibility of changing to one *more* sinful?" just as though it were a self-evident truth, that affections which are entirely of a sinful character, are forever incapable of rising to a higher degree of strength.

COMMENCEMENT OF SIN IN ADAM AND HIS POSTERITY.

Dr Ware supposes men originally innocent and pure. How does he account for their becoming sinners? He says, they *make themselves sinners*, and they do this by "yielding to temptation, by the abuse of their faculties, &c." It was my object to show that this manner of accounting for the origin of sin in individuals, is involved in difficulty and absurdity. The substance of my reasoning in Chap. V. was this. Men's yielding to temptation, abusing their faculties, &c. is itself sin. Those who commit it, are of course *already sinners*. And how does their committing sin *account* for their committing sin? Or how does their being sinners and acting as sinners, account for their *first becoming sinners*? Here, I argued, is the absurdity of making a thing account for itself. Dr Ware expresses his readiness to submit to the judgment of his readers, whether there is any absurdity in this, referring to his former publication, and to the beginning of Lett. V. in his last. I cannot enlarge on this part of the subject, having already, in my Reply, given it a full proportion of time. But I must be allowed to offer a few remarks.

In the first place, it seems to me strange, that Dr Ware, and others who agree with him, should not perceive that their mode of reasoning is unphilosophical. When we *account* for any thing philosophically, we *assign* its *causes*. The thing here to be accounted for is the *commencement of sin* in moral agents, or, the fact of their *becoming sinners* in the first instance. Now in accounting for this, we must assign causes, either physical or moral, which, in the order of nature at least, precede the existence of the effect that is to be accounted for. And we must certainly guard against assigning as a *cause* of the *first sin* in a moral agent, that which is itself *sin*. If we do this, besides running into absurdity, we have still the great question, how shall we account for *this very sin*, which by mistake we assigned as *the cause* of the *first sin*. To apply this. Dr Ware accounts for the fact that moral agents first commit sin, by their yielding to temptation, abusing their faculties, &c. But is not this yielding to temptation a sin? And does this account for the first sin? Then there is a sin which comes *before the first*. But passing over so plain an absurdity, we will consider this yield-

ing to temptation or this abuse of faculties, as really the first sin. How is *this* to be accounted for? what are the causes of this sin, which we have now found to be the *first*? Dr Ware mentions the natural appetites and passions, and the various objects which are suited to gratify them, and which, in cases constantly occurring, become *temptations to sin*. But these temptations do not operate upon a man by any physical or mechanical force. He is a moral agent; and whether he resists or yields, he acts as a moral agent. And in order that he may perform any act of a moral nature, either good or bad, he must come under the influence of some moral motive. Now suppose the temptations addressed to his appetites and passions prevail, and in opposition to the command of God, he yields to them. The thing now to be accounted for is the fact, that in these circumstances, he does yield to temptation, and sin against God. What is the *cause* of this? Is it the outward temptation? But if this, by itself, is a cause of men's sinning against God, then wherever this cause exists, sin will take place. But temptation, by itself, is not a cause of men's sinning. It certainly was not a cause in relation to our Savior. Nor is it a cause in relation to any beings, who through the time of temptation maintain in their own minds the temper of holiness. Temptation then, by itself, does not prevail to lead men into sin. Separately from their disposition, or the moral state of their minds, it is not a cause of sin. Separately from the temper of their minds, it does not produce sin. I speak here of sin in outward, visible action. If then temptation is in any sense a cause of men's sinning against God, it must be only as a part of a *complex* cause, the moral state of the mind, on which temptation operates, being essentially connected with it. This state of the mind is clearly of *principal* consequence; because, as we know from experience, the effect of temptation, as an outward cause, depends upon it entirely. If this state is wrong, an act of sinful compliance takes place; if right, an act of holy resistance. But it is to be remembered, that this moral temper or state of mind, considered as a *cause*, must in the present case, relate only to the *outward act*, whether holy or sinful. In regard then, to the outward act of sinning against God in complying with temptation, we have arrived at a satisfactory cause, though of a complex nature; namely; the existence of temptation, combined with that state of mind which

gives temptation a prevailing force, and so leads to particular acts of transgression. Thus far all is plain and certain, being perfectly agreeable to those well known principles of our nature which are learnt from uniform facts. We have come then to the first outward act of transgression, and find the cause of this to be an outward object, soliciting a moral agent to transgress, and a state or temper of mind corresponding with that outward object, and so leading to the actual transgression. But now what are we to say of this temper of mind, this disposition to transgress, which gives temptation all its efficacy? Here we find that which is sin in the highest sense, and that without which nothing else could be sin. Without a wrong affection or disposition of the mind, it is clear that no bodily action could be considered as sinful. And a careful attention to the subject will, I am sure, lead to the conclusion, that no volition or choice of the mind, can be considered as sinful, unless it is connected with a sinful disposition or affection, and prompted by it. If then we would go into a thorough investigation of the subject before us, and would account philosophically for the *very commencement* of moral evil in the minds of human beings; we must account for that wrong affection, or wrong state of moral feeling in the heart, in which we find that all the evil of bodily actions and of simple volitions really lies.

To account for a particular act of transgression, or a particular instance of yielding to temptation, by saying, that a human being has natural appetites and passions which solicit indulgence, and that these get the better of conscience, and so lead him to transgress, gives us no satisfaction. It does not reach the main difficulty. For the very point to be investigated is, how does it come to pass, that the appetites and passions get the better of conscience? In other words, how does it happen that a moral agent refuses to obey conscience, and in opposition to the divine command, yields to the solicitation of his passions? What is the cause of his doing this? Would he do it, if his *moral state* was right? Does not the fact of his yielding to his appetites in opposition to the divine command manifestly imply a disregard of the divine authority, and a preference of his own gratification to the divine glory? And is not a state of mind like this *sinful*? It is evidently the sum and substance of sin. Could a moral agent in any case yield to his appetites in some way which would imply no disre-

gard of the divine authority, and no preference of his own gratification to the divine glory ; who would ever consider him as blameworthy ? If a man supremely loves God, as every moral agent is bound to do, and prefers the divine will to his own gratification, whenever they come in competition with each other ; it is impossible we should view any action he performs in such a state of mind, as sinful. We see then that temptation, bad example, and other outward circumstances are, by themselves, wholly insufficient to account for an overt act of sin ; since such an act would never result from outward circumstances, were it not for that wrong state of moral feeling, which gives those circumstances a hurtful influence. We come then, with double demonstration, to the same result ; viz ; that *sin* lies radically and essentially in a wrong state of the heart, or of moral affection ; and of course, if there is any such thing as the commencement of sin in a moral agent, it must in reality be found, not in any outward act, nor in any volition simply considered, but in that wrong moral disposition or affection which gives rise to particular volitions, and to correspondent external actions. To account satisfactorily for the beginning of moral evil in man is to account for the beginning of wrong affection. Now does Dr Ware say any thing to account for *this* ? Does he point out its appropriate causes ? The things which he mentions are its consequences, not its causes. As to any thing in human beings themselves, which is a cause of the commencement of moral evil in their own minds, I know not what it is. The Bible does indeed teach us, that the sinfulness of mankind stands in connexion with Adam's offence, as its occasion. But excepting this connexion, I consider the existence of a wrong moral disposition or state of mind from the commencement of moral agency, as an *ultimate fact*, just as much as the existence of reason, or any of the natural appetites ; and just as the existence of holy affection would be, if Adam had not sinned, and men were from the first holy.

But Dr Ware thinks that our considering the commencement of sin in the human character as an ultimate fact, and so making it depend on the divine constitution or agency, and not on any previous voluntary act of man, is inconsistent with God's moral attributes, and with man's moral agency. But I ask, how, or in what respects it is inconsistent ? Is the commencement of moral evil,

thus understood, inconsistent with God's attributes, because it is dependent on his constitution or agency? But in this respect, as I have already endeavoured to show, Dr Ware's scheme is liable to as much objection as ours. For, suppose the beginning of sin in man is brought about, as Dr Ware represents, by the influence of his natural appetites and passions, which are in themselves innocent, but in certain circumstances prove temptations to sin, and actually prevail to induce him to commit sin. I ask, whether those natural appetites become temptations, and whether those temptations prevail to induce man to sin, according to any laws or principles of his nature? If the answer is affirmative; then I ask, were not those laws or principles constituted by the Creator? and accordingly, does not the occurrence of sin result from his constitution? But if you say, there is no regular law or principle of human nature, according to which temptations produce such an effect; then tell me, what gives temptations their prevailing force? Have they any adaptedness to produce such an effect? If you say, as you must, that they have; then in what does that adaptedness consist? and who gave them that adaptedness? If you deny such an adaptedness; then how happens it that they produce an effect which they are nowise adapted to produce? Is it through the operation of some extraordinary cause, intervening, and thrusting in an event contrary to the established order of nature? Or is it by *chance*; that is, through the operation of no cause whatever? To say this would indeed be a singular way of *accounting* for an event. But Dr Ware, in accordance with Dr Taylor and others, thinks the commencement of sin in man may be satisfactorily accounted for by the influence of the will in the use of its self-determining power. Now suppose the will has a self-determining power by which it produces such a great event. Did not God make the will, and give it such a power? And when he made it, did he not know how it would operate? And did he not so constitute the will, and all the causes which were to act upon it, that it should of course operate just as it does? Do you say, free will does not act under the influence of any motives, or causes, or regular laws whatever? Then I say, it must be a very inconvenient, unmanageable, and hazardous thing to reside in the mind, especially to rule there. Who would wish to be under such a capricious master? Who would not be afraid of being dashed upon rocks and quicksands, with such

a pilot? And yet, according to Dr Ware, God has constituted us in just such a manner as this; has put us under the guidance of a will thus high in power, and thus capricious and dangerous in the use of power. But supposing it to be true that God has given his creatures such a will as this, and formed it to act in such a manner; certainly its various movements, and the effects it produces, must in all reason be ascribed ultimately to his design. Thus, on a fair consideration of the subject, it appears that Dr Ware's scheme makes the commencement of sin in the human character as really dependent on the divine constitution and agency, as our scheme does. I see not how he can deny this, without running into Atheism.

But our system in respect to the commencement of sin in human beings is thought to be inconsistent with moral agency. I know not what particular charge of inconsistency can in this respect be brought against us in distinction from our opponents, unless it be this; that our system represents men to be the subjects, at first, of a sinful affection, which is not produced by any previous exercise of their moral agency. Our system does indeed imply this. But I contend that it cannot be urged as any inconsistency. For whenever a man begins to exercise moral agency, he has already a moral affection; he has it in the very first exercise of moral agency; as much as he has reason in the first exercise of rational agency. If then moral agency ever commences in a human being, he must of necessity have a moral affection, which could not have been produced by any exercise of his moral agency, being involved, if not presupposed, in the very *first* exercise. The conclusion must be, that the existence of such an affection is so far from being inconsistent with moral agency, that it is essential to it. Moral agency could never begin without it. It could no more begin without moral affection, than it could continue without it. But if moral affection of one kind may exist in the manner above described, why may not moral affection of another kind? If a man at the commencement of his moral agency may be virtuous and holy, and of course have a virtuous and holy affection which he did not produce by any previous exercise of his moral agency; why may he not be sinful, and of course have a sinful affection in the same manner?

When I assert that the early commencement of moral evil in

in any human being, is an *ultimate fact*; the assertion regards him merely in his personal, individual character. Accordingly, my meaning is, that there is no personal property or act in him, which can be considered as the cause of his first depravity. In *this* respect, his commencing his existence with a sinful nature, or the commencement of sin in him, cannot be accounted for. In this respect, nothing can, in the philosophical sense, be named as its *cause*; and so it is an ultimate fact. But in another respect, this fact is truly the effect of a preceding cause. Every child of Adam has a relation, not an imaginary, but a *real* relation to *him*, as the head of the human species. On the ground of this relation the first sinfulness of human beings may be accounted for. In this way, the Bible does account for it. It teaches us, that all men are sinners in consequence of the offence of one, that is, Adam. It teaches, in other words, that God, for wise reasons, constituted a connexion between the conduct of Adam, and the character of his posterity. According to this divine constitution, which doubtless had great and holy ends in view, the sin of Adam is to be regarded, as the *cause*, in the more distant sense, of the commencement of moral evil in his posterity. I presume Dr Ware refers to the views I before exhibited on this subject, when he suggests it as something inconsistent, that I should represent the commencement of depravity as an *ultimate fact*, and yet, as respects the posterity of Adam, should represent it as a fact which is to be accounted for. Answer, p. 61. In the restricted sense, above explained, I consider it as an ultimate fact. In the larger or more distant sense, the Apostle accounts for it, or assigns its cause.

There is, in my view, a manifest difference, in some respects, between the commencement of sin in Adam, and in his posterity, though in other respects, both events appear in nearly the same light. The difference referred to is briefly this. Adam began his existence in a state of moral purity. He was disposed from the first to love and obey his Creator. In this respect he differed from his posterity. Adam, by the exercise of holiness for a time, had done something towards forming a habit of holiness, which, together with his experience of the pleasures of holiness, must, we should think, have fortified him in a good degree against all temptation to sin. On this account, it would seem still more remarkable, that he should sin, than that others should sin

at the commencement of their moral agency, when they must be considered as less fortified against temptation. In Adam there was a change from previous holiness to sin; while there is no such change in his posterity. Such is the nature of the distinction which I have contemplated, between the two events. But in other respects they are obviously alike. In the first place, they are both equally dependent on God, and equally according to that wise purpose, by which he settled the great scheme of the universe. In this respect, all events which take place in the creation are alike. As the system of the creation is dependent on God's will and correspondent to his purpose, so are all the parts which compose it. This necessarily results from the nature and condition of created beings. Secondly; the two events are *equally consistent with the laws of moral agency*. The sin of Adam took place in such a way, as not to infringe any principle of moral agency. He was as perfectly a moral agent, and as justly accountable, when he first sinned, and when he began to have sinful affection, as in any previous or any subsequent action of his life, —as much so as it is possible any created being should be. The circumstance that the action or the affection was of a new moral character, different from any which had taken place in him before, made no difficulty as to the perfect exercise of moral agency. If, as a moral agent, he was so constituted as to be capable of different kinds of moral action, and moral affection, that is, good and bad; then his being actually the subject of good and bad affections and actions and his changing from one to the other, was perfectly within the compass of his moral agency. Whether he exhibits himself in the exercise of good affection, or of bad affection, or in the very point of transition from one to the other, he exhibits himself as a complete moral agent. And if we would give the history of his moral conduct, or of what he did as a moral agent, it becomes perfectly natural and proper to relate, as Moses does, the story of his fall; and the account is to be understood in the same obvious sense as the account of any other sin ever committed by a moral agent. Whatever may be said of the agency of God, or of the usual manner in which motives produce their effects in the mind; it must be admitted as an unquestionable truth, that Adam was perfectly a moral agent in the commencement and progress of his defection from God. In this view,

the account which the Scripture gives of the temptation and apostacy of Adam, is obviously as proper and satisfactory, as the account it gives of human conduct in any other instance. And this implies that, although in the previous history of Adam's life, no external motives had excited any sinful desire or volition, or led him to any sinful action, motives might produce this effect in perfect consistency with his moral agency. No reasonable man can have any doubt as to the fact, that Adam, in the act of becoming a sinner, was completely a moral agent. The Bible speaks of him as such; his own conscience condemned him as such; and God treated him as such. Indeed his moral agency in that affair stood out to view so prominently, that men in general have felt much less difficulty respecting it, than respecting the moral agency of his posterity, in the first stage of their existence. But as to this last subject, I can have no controversy with Dr Ware, as he abundantly asserts that men come into existence reasonable and accountable beings, that is, moral agents. It results however from the circumstances of their being, as was suggested in my Reply, that their moral agency cannot at first be visible to others; cannot show itself in any distinct, decided actions; but must exist in a way correspondent with the remarkable weakness of their state at the commencement of their intellectual and moral existence. But as to the *reality* of moral agency, there is no difference between them and Adam.

I have now stated my views on this subject still more particularly than I did in my Reply. Some may wish me to go farther. But how is this possible? I can reason about causes and effects in regard to the mind, as well as in regard to the physical world. But when I come to ultimate facts, I must stop. Any attempt to account for these, or to assign their philosophical causes, is folly; and must lead to the various evils which have resulted from the hypothetical mode of reasoning in the science of physics. Ultimate facts, whether in the physical or moral world, instead of being accounted for philosophically, must be referred to the divine constitution. They exist, because the Author of the universe in the exercise of his unfathomable wisdom and goodness, so determined. This is the most satisfactory solution of the difficulty. This is the best resting place I can find, both for my understanding and my heart.

I will only add here, that the same general views as those which I have expressed on the philosophy of the mind, on the nature of moral agency, and the absolute dependence of all things in the physical and moral world on the will of God, are maintained with great zeal, by those whom Dr Ware would reckon among the ablest and most consistent writers on the side of Unitarians. As to the universal agency of God, his eternal purpose respecting all events, and the perfect consistency between the most absolute divine purpose and the most perfect free agency, and as to the certain connexion between moral causes and effects in the mind, Priestley, and Belsham, and other philosophical Unitarians agree with us; although they differ from us widely as to the bearing of these principles upon other subjects. I have mentioned this agreement in regard to these philosophical principles, merely to show, that our maintaining them ought never to be made an occasion of a popular odium against us in distinction from Unitarians.

FREE-WILL AND SELF-DETERMINING POWER.

As Dr Ware, in common with Dr Taylor and other writers of the Arminian school, but in opposition to the most learned and philosophical Unitarians, considers a *free will*, or *self-determining power* in man as of such great importance in the formation of character and the direction of moral actions; I shall examine the subject a little more particularly than I have done; though I hope to guard against tiring my readers by any great prolixity on such a topic as this.

I shall first endeavour to get as clear and definite ideas as possible of Dr Ware's views. He says, Answer, p. 92, "An agent implies a principle of activity, a power of acting, not merely of being acted upon. It is not like a pivot, upon which opposite weights are balanced, and which can exert no power over the weights themselves. An intelligent agent possesses the power of modifying the influences of the several powers, on both sides, by which it is acted upon, in such a manner, that *with the same constitution as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and also in the same external circumstances of temptation*, the course of conduct may not be the same. He has the power of choosing between

different courses—and of yielding to the influence of either of two opposite motives.—The *cause* therefore of this *difference* is the *moral power of the agent himself*, or the power he has over the determinations of his own will." P. 93, "The sinner is conscious of ill desert, because he is conscious of having been not only voluntary in the sinful act, but *free*; that he had the liberty of choosing or not choosing the sinful act, and the power of actually using that liberty by directing his choice to either of the alternatives. It was in his power to submit to the influence of either the right or wrong motive." P. 66. "I expect to be able to show that beings alike by nature, and placed in similar circumstances as to all that is external to them, may yet have an inherent principle of activity in the free exercise of which all that variety of moral character may be formed, which appears in the great human family."—"We account for the variety of character among men, by a principle of intellectual and moral activity, in the free exercise of which, with different degrees of attention, in circumstances in all other respects similar, they take different directions, and arrive at all that diversity which we see in the world."

With these passages before me, which are the most particular and explicit of any I could find, I shall give the subject a brief examination.

Dr Ware attaches much importance to the *freedom* which he ascribes to the will, or to man as a moral agent. Man is "not only voluntary, but *free*." I am quite desirous of knowing exactly what sense he means to convey by this word. *Freedom* is a relative term, and must be understood according to the nature of the subject to which it relates. If we say, that one who was a prisoner or a slave, is *free*, we mean, that he is free from *confinement* or *slavery*. When the Bible speaks of sinners being made *free*, it speaks of their deliverance from the dominion of *sin*. But what is to be understood by the word, when applied to man as a moral agent? Is man free *absolutely, and in all respects*? Then he is free from the influence of *reason*, and *conscience*, and *common sense*. He is free too from *obligation*; for obligation we know is something which *binds*. And if man is free absolutely and in all respects, he is free from appetites and passions, and free too from the self-determining power of the *will*. But who would give the word such a signification as this? As Dr Ware uses it in

relation to a moral agent, he doubtless means to use it with such restrictions as the case requires. His meaning must be, not that man is free from the influence of reason, or of the natural appetites, or of the will; but that he is free from whatever is inconsistent with moral agency. But how are we to learn what is inconsistent with moral agency? Not by conjecture; not by reasoning a priori; but by experience; or by observation of what is fact in ourselves and others. To determine what is inconsistent with moral agency will be the same as to determine from what a man must be *free* in order to be a moral agent. Must a man, then, in order to be a moral agent, be free from the influence of *reason*? We answer, no. Moral agents must have reason, and in all their actions, reason must have an influence upon them in one way or another. The influence then, of *reason*, or, which is the same thing, the influence of *rational considerations*, is consistent with moral agency. I might rather say, it is *essential* to moral agency. No one can be a moral agent without it. Now suppose that reason, (I here mean *right* reason,) has such an influence over a man, that he is at all times and in all circumstances governed by it, in other words, is always sure to be actuated by those considerations which sound reason suggests; is this in any degree inconsistent with moral agency? Certainly not. We consider a moral agent to be virtuous and praise-worthy, just in proportion to the degree in which right reason influences his mind and his actions. And we look upon him as deserving our esteem and confidence just in proportion as we believe it certain that he will continue to be governed by right reason. If it comes to be a perfect certainty in our minds, that he will be invariably influenced by sound reason; we consider him worthy of unmingled confidence. If a man, like the celebrated HALE, has the habit of weighing the various considerations which belong to any subject with great care, and if by suitable discipline he has brought his mind to be so nicely balanced, that in all important questions of moral duty, he weighs things very exactly, and is determined one way or the other by the superior force of rational consideration or evidence, as surely as the most accurate balances are moved by the superior weight; we all unite in giving him the honor of an accurate judgment and an upright heart; and instead of considering him as robbed of any portion of moral agency, we congratulate him as one whose char-

acter, as an intellectual and moral agent, is elevated to an unusual degree of perfection. The conclusion from all this is, that the freedom of a moral agent does not require that he should be free from the uniform, effectual, and certain influence of reason. In other words, rational considerations may uniformly exert an effectual and certain influence over his mind, in perfect consistency with his moral agency. An objector may say, I allow all this, if the influence is not *necessary*, or if the man is not thus influenced by *necessity*. Now to make the thing easy, let me just say, that, according to our views, there can be no such necessity in the case, as implies force, or coercion, or any thing contrary to perfect voluntariness. Indeed there can be no necessity in this case, except the certain, invariable connexion which rational considerations have with a correspondent act of the mind. Now the greater the necessity of this kind, that is, the more certain and invariable the connexion between rational considerations and a correspondent act of the mind, the higher is the improvement and moral worth of the agent. To be under such influence, is moral freedom. To be free from such influence, is moral degradation and thralldom.

But I must proceed farther in this inquiry. Does the freedom attributed to a moral agent imply that he is free from the influence of *inclination* or *affection*? The answer is as easy as before. Affection is an essential attribute of a moral agent. No action can have a moral character, unless performed under its influence. And as this influence is essential to a moral agent, it may be raised to the highest degree of efficacy, without the least infringement of moral agency. Example. Suppose a man acts entirely under the control of love to God. This affection is supreme and constant. It occupies all his faculties. It governs his will. It directs his conduct. In consequence of the strength and uniformity of character which he has attained, we may regard it as a certainty, that he will, in every choice he makes, be absolutely under the influence of love to God. Is he not a moral agent? Does this commanding, overpowering influence of holy love interfere with his agency? Does it interfere with his *freedom*? Now take an example of an opposite character. A man has such a confirmed habit of covetousness or malice, and the passion has acquired such strength, that it is a matter of certainty, that he will choose and act under its influence. His depraved, wicked pas-

sion entirely governs him. Is not he too a moral agent? We conclude then, that it is consistent with moral agency, for a man, in all his volitions and actions, to be governed entirely either by a good or a bad affection.

What then is the *freedom* which belongs to a moral agent? My answer is briefly this. It is freedom from that *physical coercion or force*, which either causes actions that are not voluntary, or prevents those which the agent actually chooses to perform. So far as any man is under the influence of such physical force, we always consider him as deprived of moral agency. The freedom of a moral agent also implies a freedom from all essential disorder or derangement of the rational faculties. It implies a freedom from whatever would violate or suspend the general laws of human nature. For instance. It is a law of our nature, that a certain part of our bodily and mental actions should be under the control of the will. Now a moral agent must be free from whatever would take away that control. Again. The will itself chooses, or rather a moral agent chooses, under the influence of his *dispositions or affections*. This is as much a law of our nature as the other. The freedom essential to a moral agent implies, therefore, a freedom from whatever would prevent his will from being influenced by his affections. The suspension of this law of our nature, makes a man a *moral monster*. He loves God with all his heart, and chooses to perform acts of hatred. He perfectly loves the law, and chooses to disobey it. He loves the happiness of his fellow-men, and chooses to injure them. He hates sin, and chooses to commit it. Or he loves sin, and chooses to avoid it. I say then, to be a moral agent, a man must be free from whatever would supersede the connexion between his prevailing affection and his volitions. I have suggested already, that no volition which is not connected with an affection of the heart, and not prompted by it, can be of a moral nature. Every man, who examines the judgments he passes upon his own volitions, will be satisfied of this.

The freedom of a moral agent is a freedom from what I have mentioned above, and from every thing else of the same nature. But beyond this, I know not what freedom a man ever possessed, or can desire. If Dr Ware means any thing different from this, I must wait to be informed what it is.

But Dr Ware, as we have seen, thinks there must be "a power of choosing between different courses, and of yielding to either of two opposite motives;" "a power of modifying the influence of the several powers, on both sides, &c."

I am fully persuaded that this subject, though abstract in its nature, and often wrapt up in a very ambiguous phraseology, is yet as capable, as most other metaphysical subjects, of being presented in a clear and satisfactory light. I have therefore been desirous of giving it a much more thorough investigation, than will be compatible with my present limits. The design of these remarks requires only a brief examination.

Doubtless Dr Ware means to speak of a power which man really possesses; a power, which we know actually belongs to ourselves, by being conscious of exercising it. I grant that man has a power of choosing between different courses, and of yielding to either of two opposite motives." But *in what way* has he this power? and by what means does he bring it into action? Has he the power of choosing entirely at *random*, without *any motive whatever*? Has he the power of yielding to one or the other of two opposite motives, *without some reason* for thus yielding? I might inquire whether such a power is desirable. But I choose rather to inquire, whether any man really *possesses* it? Is any one conscious of having ever exercised it?

Every man has often made a choice between two different courses; and every man would be inclined to say, he has had a *reason* for the choice. He has surely had *some* reason, otherwise his will must have broken its natural alliance with his rational faculties, and acted—I know not how,—perhaps merely to show its independence. If so, then *this* was the *reason* of its action. Every man has exercised the power of yielding to one or the other of two opposite motives. Worldly honor has been addressed to him as a motive to one course of action; the favor of God and the pleasures of religion, as a motive to another. These have been two opposite motives. He has exercised his power, and yielded, as I will suppose, to the influence of the latter. But had he not a *reason* for this? And was not his voluntary act of yielding influenced altogether by that reason? If any one is disposed to say, that he had *power* in those very circumstances, to yield to the other motive; my reply is, that we are now inquiring not for

an imaginary power, but for a power which we know man possesses, by the fact that he has exercised it. Has any man ever yielded to either of two opposite motives, or chosen between two different courses of action, without a reason? I allow that many men choose without such reasons as justify their choice. But what man ever made a choice without *some* reason? If any man soberly thinks he has a power to choose without being influenced by any reason or motive whatever; let him make a trial. Suppose then he is to go either to Canada, or to Mexico. There are some reasons in favor of Canada, and others in favor of Mexico. Suppose these reasons appear equal. This perhaps may give him a fair opportunity to show whether he has the power in question. Let him then strain up the faculties of his mind to make a choice in the manner described, carefully guarding against having his choice influenced by any superior strength of reasons in favor of what he chooses. Most men in such a case of equilibrium would examine with increased care, the reasons on both sides, so that they might discover which was the strongest, and determine accordingly. And the man, who is making this experiment, finds himself quite inclined to do this, and actually begins to weigh the reasons on one side and on the other, to see which are of the greatest moment. But he is reminded that the object of the trial is, to ascertain that he has a power of choosing in a sovereign, independent manner, without being influenced by any reason; and so he rouses himself again to the effort. His will, according to its old habit, soon begins to lean this way, or that; but he immediately checks it, because he finds it does this under the influence of motives. By and by he says, this is likely to prove a tedious, painful exercise. I would rather go either way than be held in this uneasy posture any longer. I will even appeal to the lot, as Wesley did to decide a great point in the Arminian controversy; or, to make short work of it, I will turn round a few times with my eyes shut, and then will go North or South, just as I find myself standing, when I first open my eyes. He does this. On opening his eyes, he finds himself standing with his face to the South, and for *this very reason* chooses to pursue that course. It is a kind of factitious reason. But it is sufficient to influence a mind, which would not suffer itself to be influenced by any better. Let any man make experiments in different ways, upon himself, and he

will always find his will pertinaciously set upon having *some motive* to influence its determinations, and even disposed to complain of a kind of insult, if one attempts to force it to act in any other way. The law of our nature for which I contend, is established by every instance of fair deliberation; as the object of such deliberation is, not to bring the mind to choose without being governed by motives, but to discover which are the motives that should govern it. If any man can be found, who has the habit of choosing without the influence of motives; I freely give him the credit of having a will vastly pliable and expert; though it must be at the expense of much more estimable qualities.

But the power of a man to put forth volitions without the influence of motives may be tested in another way. Thus. It is proposed to him, as before, to go either to Canada or to Mexico; but he has no reason or motive whatever for going either way. And the case is such, that he can have none, however long he may deliberate on the subject. Now let him try to bring his mind to choose between the two. Let him rouse to the highest pitch of energy, his self-determining power, and after that power has done its best, see whether he will go either one way or the other, unless he is carried by force.

There is still another statement of the case. The man, as before, is to go to Canada or to Mexico. As his circumstances are, all the reasons which occur, or can occur to his mind are in favor of his going to Canada, and these reasons are many and of great weight. Now let him try to exert his power of choosing independently of motives, and see if he can bring his will to decide in favor of Mexico.—If his mind is at all like mine, I predict that he will find no small difficulty in the way.

When I speak of *reason* or *motive* in this discussion, I refer, as must have been evident, not only to external objects, or considerations from without the mind, but to *the disposition* or *affection of the mind itself*. I refer to this chiefly; because the effect of every thing external to the mind depends on this. The disposition, affection, or temper of the mind is, according to the invariable law of our nature, *the grand motive*. Voluntary actions flow from it, as effects from a cause. They who love God, keep his commands. Their voluntary actions flow from their affections, whether those affections are good or bad. There may indeed be a

strife among the passions or affections. One may exist, and be a motive, even a powerful motive, and yet may be overcome by another more powerful. The question of self-determining power in relation to this point, is, whether man has a power to choose, except under the influence of affection? In moral subjects, the question is, whether he has power to choose, except under the influence of *moral* affection? But the question more properly is, whether a man, in regard to moral subjects particularly, ever did actually make a choice which was not influenced by his affections or dispositions? If no man ever did this, then the question of a power to do it is certainly of no consequence. For what can be the value of a power, which is never exercised? And what evidence can there be of the existence of such a power.

It seems to me very clear, that no choice or determination of mind, not influenced by the affections, can ever be considered as being either good or bad, or as having any moral character. I consider it therefore as a law of our nature, fully ascertained by facts, that every voluntary action is prompted by the disposition or affection of the heart, and that it is the influence of the disposition or affection upon voluntary action, that renders such action, in any case, holy or sinful.

The considerations, which prove that *motives*, in the comprehensive sense in which I have used the word, are the proximate causes of volition and moral action, are so conclusive in my mind, and the position is so perfectly consonant to our best views of a rational being, that I have been not a little surprised that any man could embrace a different opinion. It is certainly the common, not to say uniform experience of every human being, that motives excite voluntary action, and that such action is more or less vigorous in proportion to the strength of the motive by which it is influenced. And whenever we would excite men to *choose* and *act*, our knowledge of the human mind leads us instantly to present *motives* before them, as the only way in which they can be influenced; and as a sure way, unless the state of their minds or some other counteracting motive prevents. Why then should any of us contend for a principle, which is so contrary to our experience, —so inconsistent with common practice?—a principle, which would in fact deprive man of the advantage of his rational nature, as it would require him to act in a manner utterly incompatible with the use of reason.

If my opponents think my remarks out of place, because they contend as well as we, that *reason* is to be exercised in all the actions of men; my reply is, that men exercise reason no farther, than they govern their choice and their conduct by *motives*. If by the freedom of the will, or the self-determining power, for which they plead, they intend nothing but this, that a man has power to deliberate; that his will is influenced, not by compulsion, but by rational considerations; that being wholly free from constraint, he will always choose and act, as motives prompt; then there is no ground for dispute. When any of us speak of moral or philosophical *necessity*, a term which I have wished wholly to avoid in this controversy, we mean nothing more than the constancy and certainty of the connexion, just stated, between motives and voluntary action.

But I must not quit this subject, without a more particular examination of Dr Ware's scheme, as exhibited in the quotations above made from his Answer. "An agent," he says, "implies a principle of activity, a power of acting, not merely of being acted upon." I fully agree to this; only having it understood that the power of acting which belongs to a moral agent, is a power to act according to the laws of a rational and moral nature; in other words, to act under the influence of *motives*. In this way, and in this only, has man power to act, as a moral agent. Our author says farther; "an intelligent agent possesses the power of modifying the influences of the several powers, on both sides, by which it is acted upon, in such a manner, that *with the same constitution as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and also in the same external circumstances of temptation, the course may not be the same.*" I know not that any objection lies against this. As an advocate for the general doctrine of moral or philosophical necessity, I admit, nay, I affirm, that two men may have "the same constitution as respects the strength of the appetites and passions, and the power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, and may also be in the same external circumstances of temptation;" and yet that they may pursue different courses of conduct; because, though alike in all these respects, they may be totally unlike as to *moral principle*, or the *reigning affection* of the heart. The constitution of men, as respects the strength of their natural appe-

tites and passions, has no necessary connexion with their moral affections. For though a man's natural appetites and passions are strong, and are the occasion of many a dangerous temptation, as Paul's and Peter's were, he may have a holy affection strong enough to resist his passions, and overcome temptation. This holy affection is the prevailing motive. Again. Two men may be alike as to "the power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong," and yet be totally unlike as to moral affection. Accordingly, although alike as to power of reason, and knowledge of right and wrong, their conduct, prompted by different moral affections, may be widely different. The same as to external circumstances of temptation. One who is exposed to them, may have a strength of holy principle which will lead him uniformly to guard against them; another may have a depravity of heart, which will lead him to sinful compliance. All this is conformable to common experience. All this results from the laws of the human mind. Though in all the respects mentioned by Dr Ware, men may be alike, they may pursue very different courses, because they may be under the influence of very different internal motives. If this is what Dr Ware means by "the power of choosing between different courses, or of yielding to the influence of either of two opposite motives;" we fully agree with him. We have exercised such a power every day of our life. We have chosen between two different courses. We have yielded to the influence of one or the other of two opposite external motives, just according to our predominant inclination or affection. And we have done the same with regard to those internal motives, which arise from our various natural appetites and passions. There may be a principle in the human mind, superior to all motives of this character. In every good man there is such a principle. He loves Christ more than any earthly object, and in comparison with him, counts all things loss. Under the influence of this holy affection, which constitutes his character as a Christian, he denies himself, takes up his cross, and is willing, when duty requires, to suffer and die.

We assert too, that men have what Dr Ware calls "the power of modifying the influences of the several powers, on both sides," by which they are acted upon, so that in similar circumstances, so far as he describes them, they may choose different

courses, *according to their predominant disposition*. We always do modify the influence of all other motives by the grand motive, the reigning affection of the heart.

In all the passages above referred to, Dr Ware has fallen short of a full statement of the case. The point at issue between him and Calvinists is not, whether two men, who are alike in some respects, and are acted upon by many similar motives, can choose differently; but whether they can choose differently when they are alike in *all* respects, that is, when *all* the proper antecedents of choice are the same; in other words, when all the external and all the internal motives to volition are the same. A difference in the prevailing affection of their minds, whatever else is alike, will always cause a difference of volition. But suppose every thing which has the nature of a motive is the same in both; then what can be the cause of a difference of volitions? This is the question. We say, there never was any difference in such circumstances; that there never can be; and that to assert it, is to assert that an effect exists without a *cause*. Dr Ware is, however, of another opinion. He says "the cause of this difference is the moral power of the agent himself, or the power he has over the determinations of his own will." Again he says more explicitly; "we account for the variety of character among men, by a principle of intellectual and moral activity, in the free exercise of which, with different degrees of attention, in *circumstances in all other respects similar*, they take different directions, &c." The case to which he means to refer in this reasoning, must be one where all the motives to volition are the same, and yet a difference of volition takes place. I understand that he accounts for the difference of volition in such a case not by any difference of motives influencing the choice, but by "the power which the agent himself has over the determinations of his own will."—But it is clear that a man's having a power does not account for the particular use he makes of it. If you should ask the cause, why one man goes, or chooses to go to Great Britain, and another to Otaheite; you would think it a strange answer for me to say, the cause is, that they have power to go to either place, as they please. Their having power was indeed necessary to their going at all. But that power, possessed equally by both, was no reason why one of them should choose to go to Great Britain rather than to Otaheite, or the other to Ota-

heite rather than to Great Britain. If effects require causes, a difference of effects requires a difference of causes. In the circumstances of similarity described by Dr Ware, the fact that men choose different courses is ascribed to this cause, namely, the power they have over the determinations of their own wills. But how can their power be a cause without *acting*? And how can the same act of power in two cases, where all the other circumstances are also the same, be the cause of different effects? These different effects, all will allow, must be produced by different acts of power. So far there can be no doubt. But as to these different acts of power; had *they* any cause? Or did the two men put them forth without any reasons or motives? My opponents would be loth to say this. Because if there are any acts of the mind, of which there is no philosophical cause, they must be ultimate facts, and so must depend entirely on the divine constitution. But my opponents would hardly admit that those different exercises of power, which account for different courses of voluntary conduct, are thus immediately dependent on God. They must say then, to be consistent, that those different acts of power have no cause whatever. They must say so, because they think this circumstance essential to moral agency. Thus then the case stands. Men's activity, or the power they have over the determinations of their own will is, Dr Ware says, the cause of different volitions. But it can be a cause in no other way, than by action; and it can be a cause of different volitions in no way but by its different actions. Now if you say, that those different actions are always influenced by motives, you are a Calvinist. If you say, they are not, you say what plainly implies that they are neither good nor bad, and that those who put them forth no longer act as rational beings. Thus that very self-determining power, which was thought an essential part of moral agency, proves, on inquiry, to be its destruction.

If it be said again, that man, thus entirely under the control of motives, external or internal, is under the influence of necessity; my answer is, first, that the very supposition precludes *physical* necessity. Secondly, man is indeed under the necessity of being a rational and moral agent, and of acting as such. He is bound to this by the constitution given him by his Creator. He *must be* a rational and moral agent. And he *must be* influenced in all his

actions in a manner suited to his rational and moral nature. This is all the necessity I assert. But this necessity, I acknowledge, is such, that no choice of a moral nature ever did take place, or ever can, without a motive. Minor motives, of various kinds and various degrees of strength, are constantly modified and overcome by one great, governing motive. But to say that man modifies these minor motives by one of superior strength, and that he has power to do this, is very different from saying, that he chooses or acts, or has power to choose or act in any other way, than *as impelled by the most powerful motive*.

After the foregoing remarks, which have been extended to a much greater length than I at first designed, the remaining particulars in Dr Ware's statement may be quickly disposed of.

"The sinner," he says, "is conscious of ill desert, because he is conscious of having been not only voluntary in the sinful act, but free." We assert too that the sinner is conscious of being *free*, that is, free from physical force or coercion, and free from mental derangement; free in short, from every thing which would suspend the laws of his intellectual nature, and every thing too which would prevent him from acting according to his choice, or from choosing according to motives. In such respects as these, he is *free*; and freedom of this kind is essential to his moral accountability. But after all, that which renders him criminal is the fact that he has a wrong disposition or affection of heart, and chooses and acts under its influence. So that, strictly speaking, the sinner's ill desert does not in any measure consist in his being voluntary and free, because voluntariness and freedom, according to Dr Ware's own representation, belong no more to him, than to one who is free from sin. His ill desert must consist in something which distinguishes him from one who is holy. And what is this but the fact, that he chooses and acts under the influence of a wrong motive, while one who is holy, chooses and acts under the influence of a right motive. The power of choosing right or wrong makes him a *moral agent*. His actually choosing *wrong* makes him a *sinner*. And this choice is the thing to be accounted for.

When Dr. Ware says, it is in a man's "power to submit either to the right or wrong motive," he says that which may indeed be very true, but which is after all very ambiguous, because it does

not describe the case fully. A man may have two particular motives set before him, for example, a motive to speak the truth, and a motive to lie. But these two particular motives may not comprise every thing which can influence his determination. The grand motive may lie in the disposition or affection of his own heart. He may fear God; and this pious affection may give efficacy to the particular motive which prompts him to speak the truth. Or he may have some selfish affection, which will give efficacy to the other motive, and lead him to speak falsehood. It appears then that, besides those two motives, between which he is to decide, there are other motives, namely, the dispositions of his own mind, which, according to the law of his nature, must ultimately govern his choice. So that to say he has power to yield to the one or the other of those two particular motives, seems to be only saying, that he has power to govern himself by a still more powerful motive than either, namely, the prevailing affection of the heart. But no man ever chose and acted contrary to that which was the prevailing affection of his heart at the time. To say therefore, that a man has power to yield to either of two opposite motives, leaving out the consideration of that inward motive which controls all others, is but a partial account of the subject, and so exposes our reasoning to no small perplexity.

The following passage, quoted above from Dr Ware's Answer, is liable to the same objection. It does not fully describe the case under consideration. He says he expects "to show that beings alike by nature, and placed in similar circumstances *as to all that is external to them*, may yet have an inherent principle of activity in the free exercise of which all that variety of moral character may be formed, which appears in the great human family." He says in a parallel passage, that it is in the free exercise of this principle, that men, in circumstances *in all other respects similar*, take different courses. But what does he mean by this *inherent principle of activity*? If he means the *predominant affection* or *disposition* of the heart, then the sentiment is, that in similar circumstances in all that is external to them, men will be prompted to pursue different courses by this predominant affection; or that this affection is the inherent principle of activity, in the free exercise of which they take different directions. To this view of the subject we fully accede. But if Dr. Ware means a principle of activity, which leads men in

any case to choose and act otherwise than their predominant affection prompts them to do; then I must wait for him to show that there is such a principle or power in human nature, or that the supposition of such a principle can be reconciled with any just views of moral agency. And while the subject is under consideration, it may be a satisfaction to him to review Edwards's Treatise on the Will, and Priestley's on Philosophical Necessity. For myself, I can account very satisfactorily for the different courses men pursue, and the variety of character which they exhibit, by the influence of external circumstances in connexion with the particular affections or dispositions of their own minds. I know that these circumstances and these affections have always influenced my own conduct; and I expect they always will. Nor do I know any other power or principle which ever did influence, or ever can influence the choice or actions of man.

I fear I have carried this discussion to an irksome length. But I shall be willing to bear the reproach of some repetition and prolixity, if I may but help to clear away the difficulties which have surrounded a subject of so much importance, and prepare the minds of any of my readers for more just views of mental philosophy.

WHETHER A PROPENSITY TO SIN IS SINFUL.

In my Reply, I represented the very essence of sin as consisting in a *propensity, inclination, or disposition* to sin. Dr Ware thinks that a propensity to sin is not sinful, and implies no guilt. In my apprehension, as well as in Dr Ware's, the dispute on this point arises in a great measure from the fact, that we "annex different ideas to the word *propensity*." By propensity to sin Dr Ware evidently means nothing but "the natural appetites, affections, and passions," such as "a strong appetite for intoxicating liquor, irritability of temper, and strength of passion." Now I am as ready as Dr Ware, to affirm, that these, considered as original properties of human nature, are not sinful, and imply no guilt. But I doubt much as to the propriety of calling any of these a propensity or inclination to sin. These may all exist in one who is entirely obedient, in heart and in life, to the divine law. A man's hunger and thirst, however strong, are not, in themselves, sinful, be-

cause they have not a moral character. In their own nature, they are neither obedience nor disobedience. But in certain circumstances, eating and drinking are prohibited by him who made us ; that is ; we are in certain cases forbidden to gratify our natural appetites. Here our *moral* nature is brought into view. In these circumstances we are called to the exercise of our moral agency, which implies a moral affection or disposition. What then is our moral affection ? In other words, are we inclined to obey, or to disobey the command of God ? This inclination or propensity to act in view of the divine command, in other words, this inclination or propensity to obey or disobey God, is what I mean by inclination or propensity to holiness or to sin. Dr Ware speaks, Answer, p. 34, of a man's being withheld by *the fear of God* from yielding to temptation ; of his *religiously* abstaining from the indulgence of his passions ; and of his exercising a virtuous principle. Now this fear of God, this virtuous and religious principle, is, in such a case, the grand governing principle of action ; and this is what I mean by a propensity or disposition to acts of holy obedience. But if a man, in such a case, has a propensity or disposition to disregard the divine command, and to pursue the gratification of his own passions, as his highest object, he has what I mean by a propensity or disposition to *sin*. This disposition or propensity, being of a moral character, is itself sinful ; yea, it is what every one must consider as the very essence of sin. Being a *moral* agent, as well as a *physical* agent, man must be capable of a moral propensity or inclination, as well as a physical one. The *moral* propensity is what I speak of ; and it is what I naturally should speak of, when treating of man as a subject of moral law. Propensity to sin, taken in this obvious sense, must be considered as sinful, by every one who admits the existence of moral good and evil. There is no way in which men more frequently describe the character of one whom they consider as really criminal, in distinction from those who are not really criminal, than by saying, he has a disposition or inclination to do wrong.

The sum of what I wished to say on this topic is this. If propensity to sin is taken to mean what it naturally means, that is, a *moral* propensity, an inclination or affection of a *moral* nature ; it is certainly sinful. The very existence of such an inclination or affection is sin, or there can be no such thing as sin in the world.

If it is said, the sin consists in yielding to temptation ; my reply is, that such yielding never takes place without a *disposition* to yield, and that this *disposition*, after all, constitutes the sin of yielding. For if a man should yield to temptation, without any *disposition* to yield, he would manifestly be blameless. But if *propensity to sin* is used to denote any of those appetites and passions which are essential to our animal, social, or intellectual nature ; then certainly it is not, in itself, sinful ; and it becomes sinful only when a man is led by a disposition which is morally wrong, to give it an improper or forbidden indulgence. In other words, it becomes sin only when it is brought under the influence of a *real propensity or disposition to sin*.

DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AND PREDETERMINATION.

Having given so much attention to this subject in my Letters and Reply, and having labored to place the Orthodox doctrine in as perspicuous a light as possible, I hoped there would be no occasion for my returning to the subject again. I find however several passages in Dr Ware's Answer, pp. 120—127 which seem to require a brief consideration.

He says, "I admit that no unforeseen occurrence can take place ; but does it hence follow, that no event *not predetermined* can take place ? That may be foreseen, respecting which there is no determination." In p. 95 he compares the divine foreknowledge to that knowledge which we have of an event ; and if I mistake not he does, in some other passages, argue that God may foreknow what will take place without determining it, because *we* may.

In order to a just investigation of this subject, it is important to keep in mind, that every event which takes place, is dependent on its proper causes ; a physical event on physical causes ; and a moral event on moral causes. An event in the moral world is distinguishable from an event in the physical world, not as being less dependent on its proper causes, but as being of a different nature, and dependent on causes of a different nature. It is as common, and it is surely as important, to inquire for the proper causes of a particular instance of murder or suicide, as for the causes of the tides or the trade winds. The conduct of Peter in denying

Christ, of Judas in betraying him, and of Pilate in delivering him up to be crucified, proceeded as really from appropriate moral causes, as thunder or the rainbow proceeds from appropriate physical causes.

To come to the particular subject above introduced; I may know that an event will hereafter take place, from the knowledge I have of its causes, or of the regular laws of nature respecting it. Thus from my knowing what are the *causes* of an eclipse, I know that an eclipse will at such a time take place. In the same way I know that in certain circumstances I shall see the rainbow. I may also know that an event will take place, because I have been informed of it by one who is entitled to my perfect confidence. Now it is manifest that whether my knowledge of a future event results from my acquaintance with the causes of that event, or from the declaration of those who possess higher intelligence than I do, it does not necessarily imply any predetermination or design in me respecting the event. And why does it not? I answer, because neither the occurrence of the event, nor the causes of it depend in the least measure on me. It will take place without my determination or agency. But if the event depends on my voluntary agency as its cause, my foreknowledge of the event implies design or purpose. For example. If the products of my field depend on my agency in planting and cultivating it, then my knowing what the particular products will be, or whether there will be any products at all, must imply that I have a design respecting them. I cannot know that there will be a crop of wheat unless it is my purpose to sow wheat. This then I must consider as an obvious principle; that just so far as any future event, or its cause, is dependent on my voluntary agency, my foreknowledge of the event implies that I have a purpose or design respecting that agency, from which the event is to proceed.

It is equally true that events in the moral world have their appropriate causes. If those events are to take place without any dependence on me; then my foreknowing them implies no purpose or design in me. I foreknow them as depending on causes, which are entirely under the control of another. But if any events in the moral world, or their moral causes, are dependent on me, my foreknowing them implies that I have a design respecting them.

The general principle above stated is capable of as clear proof as any truth in natural science. And it applies, in all its extent, to the subject under consideration. All events in the natural and moral world are effects, and dependent on their appropriate causes. Those causes are dependent ultimately on God. He constituted the connexion between them and their effects. The whole system of physical and moral causes was appointed by the all wise Creator. His knowledge of the effects implies a knowledge of their causes. And his knowledge of causes and effects which depend on him, implies that he has a purpose or determination respecting them.

The conclusiveness of the argument which supports our theory is perfectly obvious, if all events in the physical and moral world do really depend on physical and moral causes. But if they do not depend on physical and moral causes, they must either be ultimate facts, and so depend immediately on the agency of God without any secondary causes, as creation did; or they must be *self-existent*. But no man of sober understanding can believe either of these. If according to the scheme of my opponent, events in the moral world depend on the self-determining power of man's will as their proper cause; it affects not the strength of the present argument. For surely no one can doubt that this cause, as well as all others, was appointed by God, and that the connexion which it has with its effects is just what he determined it should be. To say, that God created man's will and endued it with a power to act in such a manner, and that he knew exactly how it would act under the influence of all the causes which would operate upon it, and yet that it was not his design that it should act thus, would be strangely absurd. For if it was not his design that it should act thus, why did he form it in such a manner, and place it under the operation of such causes, as he knew would lead to such a result.

From the view we have taken of the subject, it becomes, I think, very evident, that Dr Ware's attempt to make a separation between the divine foreknowledge and the divine purpose is unsuccessful. The foreknowledge and purpose of man may indeed be separate, except when the events foreknown depend on his purpose and agency. But as the whole system of things, the whole series of causes and effects in the natural and moral world,

depends on God's will ; his knowledge of future events is nothing but the knowledge of what will result from those very causes which he himself has appointed and put in operation. If there were any event in the creation, which did not result from causes appointed and regulated by God ; I acknowledge he might foreknow that event, without any determination or purpose respecting it. But nothing like this can be found in the universe. The whole system of created things depends on God's will. And he foreknows the events which are to occur in that system, as resulting from their proper causes,—causes which he appoints. And this is only saying, he foreknows them *truly*, or foreknows them exactly as *they are*.

Dr Ware says, Answer, p. 121, “ that the simple foreknowledge of God has no influence in producing the event foreknown. It has no relation to the causes, whether physical or moral, by which it is to be produced ; but only to the certainty of the event.” The event then, according to what is implied in this very passage, is to be produced by proper causes, either physical or moral. Foreknowledge does not produce the event, because it does not produce its proper causes. Those causes depend not on God's knowledge. On what do they depend ? We say they depend on God's will. And the short proof we give is this. They are either independent and self-existent causes ; (which no one will say ;) or they depend on the will of some intelligent being ; and that being must be God, or some creature. If they depend on a creature, that creature depends wholly on God ; and so those causes still ultimately depend on God. It comes then to this ; it is not God's foreknowledge, but an act of his will, that produces the causes of the event foreknown. They result from his appointment. Thus he foreknows the event, as depending on its proper causes ; and he foreknows those causes as depending on his appointment. In this way, Dr Ware's representation that foreknowledge does not produce the event foreknown, nor the causes of that event, helps us to prove the necessity of something which does produce them, which must be an act of God's will.

But Dr Ware tries to relieve the difficulty by this representation. “ The purpose of God is not a purpose that beings endowed with certain powers shall perform certain specific acts ; but that they shall be exposed to certain influences, to the operation of cer-

tain motives, and that certain consequences shall follow the choice they freely make.—It is not, that Peter or Judas shall actually make *this* choice, and pursue *this* course ;—but thus, Peter shall have the power of choosing and pursuing this or the opposite course, and according as he shall pursue the one or the other, he shall be rewarded or punished.”—“It was predetermined that the being in question should act freely, not that it should perform the specific act which it did perform.”

According to this, God determines that men, constituted as they are, “shall be exposed to certain influences, to the operation of certain motives,” which are the only causes of volition ; but he does not determine what shall be the effect of those causes. He determines every thing but the choice which men actually make. He determines to make them just such beings, to put them in just such a situation, to expose them to the operation of just such causes ; and he perfectly knows what will be their choice under the influence of those causes ; but he does not determine what that choice shall be.—All this appears to me just as absurd, as to assert that God determines the causes of the rainbow, but not the rainbow itself—that he determines the causes of an earthquake, but does not determine the earthquake. The connexion between moral causes and effects is as certain as between physical causes and effects. And it is as utterly inconceivable, that God should determine the causes without determining the effects, in one case as in the other. But Dr Ware says ; “it was determined that the being in question should *act freely*.” But how ? Did God determine that he should perform the free act which he does perform ? No. Did God determine that he should perform any other free act ? No. How then ? It must be thus. God determined that he should *act freely*,—but “not that he should perform the specific act which he does perform,” nor any other ;—determined that he should *act*, and, if he should happen to act in this way or that, that he should *act freely* ;—or determined that he should *act freely*, if he should act at all, though that was left quite undecided. Let us examine this statement in relation to Pilate. It was determined that he should *act freely*, whether he released Jesus, or delivered him up to be crucified. But God knew that he would deliver up Jesus. And if, when God determined that he should *act freely*, he had his eye upon any particular act, it

must have been upon the one which he knew would be performed. Accordingly, if God determined that he should perform *any act whatever*, or that he should *act at all*, he must have determined that he should perform the particular act which he did perform. This is the question to be decided; did God determine that he should perform *that specific act*? Dr Ware answers, God did not determine this. But Peter and John give a different answer. They say, Acts iv. 27, 28, that Pilate and the other enemies of Christ were gathered together, to do *whatever the hand and counsel of God had determined before to be done*; or as Schleusner renders it,—what in his pleasure and will he had decreed to be done. Show what they actually did, and you show what God had determined should be done.

So we say in all cases. God determined that men should *act freely* in the very manner in which they do act; or that they should perform those very *free acts* which they do perform; as there is no other conceivable way in which God could either determine that they should act at all, or appoint the moral causes that should influence them. But the statement of Dr Ware is strange and enigmatical. God determined that men should *act freely*; but not in that particular way in which they do act, nor in any other way particularly, but in some way indefinitely, not implying any specific act whatever. Accordingly, if men should carry God's determination into effect exactly, they would *act*, it seems, *and act freely*, but would perform *no one particular act* after all; because, though *action* was determined, it was *such* action, if such there be, as implies no particular act.

To me it is a subject of astonishment, that my opponents are not impressed with the frequency and the explicitness with which the Scriptures assert the doctrine which I maintain. The inspired writers teach that God, in a thousand thousand instances, pre-determines the good and bad actions of men, as well as the moral causes of those actions, and the ends to be answered by them. It would be impossible for me to express this doctrine in stronger or more unequivocal language, than that which the Scriptures use to express it. Why then do men, professing to believe the Scriptures, reject the doctrine? Simply, because they think it inconsistent with man's moral agency, and with God's attributes. But I have never seen a particle of proof that it is inconsistent with

either. It is most evidently as consistent with God's attributes, as it is to determine the general system of the moral universe; for the general system is a nonentity, except as it is made up of particular parts. And the system of causes, which all will allow God has put in operation, is an empty sound, except as it includes those effects which result from it. And as to *moral agency*, there is not a single thing belonging to it, which is infringed by our doctrine. Nay; that determination and agency of God on which all moral causes and effects depend, directly establish and preserve moral agency. I will engage to show that there are as many and as great difficulties attending moral agency, from God's foreknowledge, as from his purpose. For Dr Ware owns, that it is obviously impossible for the fact not to be, which is foreknown. But it is said, divine knowledge does not *make* it impossible. True. But there is some cause of its impossibility. And what is that?—God's foreknowledge implies also a certainty of the event foreknown. But it is said, it does not *cause* that certainty. True again. But there is a cause of that certainty. The event could not be certain, did not something make it certain. Now what is the cause of the certainty of the event which is foreknown? Show the cause of the impossibility which Dr Ware allows in the one case, and of the certainty he allows in the other, and you show all that our doctrine contains, inconsistent with moral agency.

To conclude this article. What has taken place in regard to the doctrine of the divine purpose, strikingly exemplifies the truth of a remark before made; namely; that men are led, by the consideration of difficulties which they cannot solve, to reject doctrines supported by the clearest evidence. The evidence, both rational and scriptural, on which this doctrine rests, is as near demonstration, as the evidence of metaphysical or moral truth in any case whatever. And I cannot but think it unworthy of those, who boast of inquiring freely and independently after the truth, and of following boldly whithersoever it may lead, to suffer themselves to start back from a doctrine resting on so firm a basis, and to be governed by misconceptions which a thorough examination might quickly correct, or perplexed with difficulties which the light of divine truth might enable them fully to solve.

CURSORY OBSERVATIONS.

I have thought it best, thus far, to confine myself to the discussion of particular topics. I shall now make a few brief remarks on passages which I find here and there in Dr Ware's Answer, without any regard to order.

Dr Ware speaks, p. 69. of "the strain of popular eloquence which runs through" a part of Chap. 6 in my Reply. He says, "nothing is more easy than thus to turn an adversary's argument or opinion into ridicule by a broad caricature;" and he undertakes to repel the ridicule by showing how a similar strain of irony may be applied to the opposite opinion. Now the difference between the two cases is this. My object as stated p. 116, was to try the correctness of the principle which Dr Ware's reasoning involves, by showing what must follow from the admission of that principle. I did not mean to give a caricature. I aimed not at ridicule or rant, but sober argument. I supposed then, and still suppose, that I pointed out the real consequences of Dr Ware's opinion. And it would certainly have been well for him to show, at least in some important particulars, that his opinion does not lead to such consequences. This, however, he does not attempt. But instead of this he makes an effort to degrade Orthodoxy by a strain of irony and sarcasm in which he does not even pretend to regard justice or truth. I say he does not pretend to do this. For after he has given such sportive license to his pen, he tells us with his customary frankness, pp. 74, 75, that he does not mean what he has written "should be taken for serious argument;" and makes an apology, for "adopting such a strain of levity," and "thereby violating the decorum he intended to observe." This very honorable apology forbids the remarks I should otherwise have offered on the pages referred to.

Dr Ware denies that Pharaoh, Jeroboam, and Judas can be considered, as examples of human nature. He says, p. 66, "I might with as much propriety mention Moses, David, and Paul, as examples of human nature; for, so far as moral character is in question, we have no more evidence, that they owed theirs to the special influence of the Spirit of God, than that the others owed their opposite characters to a special influence." I have quoted

this passage for the purpose of showing to what lengths Dr Ware's scheme of religion has carried him. He thinks there is no more reason to say that Moses, David and Paul had any special influence of the Spirit in becoming pious, than Pharaoh, Jeroboam, and Judas had in becoming impious; in other words, that men of the most depraved and most hateful character are as really indebted to a special influence of the Spirit for the formation of their character, as the most virtuous and holy are. According to this, the vilest men have as much reason to thank God for giving them his special influence to excite them to wickedness, as the most godly have to thank him for giving them his special influence to excite them to holiness. And if the views above exhibited are correct, it must, for ought I can see, be just as suitable for a wicked man to pray for the special influence of the Spirit to help him commit sin, as for a good man to pray for that influence to help him do his duty. I am well persuaded that Dr Ware would shudder at the thought of such consequences. He could not follow his assertion into these obvious results, without doing violence to every principle of piety. He could not do it without forgetting the language of gratitude and devotion, which he must have repeated hundreds of times, both in public and in private.

There is a passage, p. 125, which requires some attention. I had urged, in my Reply, that no injustice is done to those who are left to remain in sin and perish, because they receive no more than what they deserve. They are punished only according to their ill desert. Dr Ware says; "this might be urged with a semblance of justice, were the sinfulness in question their own act, and not the act of God." He means to assert, that, according to the Orthodox theory, the sins of the wicked are not their own acts, but the acts of God. But upon what grounds does he assert this? The first is, that, according to the Orthodox theory, sinners are in that condition, in which they were placed by their Maker. In regard to this, I have already shown, again and again, that Dr Ware's theory makes man as really dependent on God, and attributes his sins as really to God's agency, as the Orthodox theory. I could easily prove in this place, if it were necessary, that the whole constitution of man, and all the laws or principles which govern his actions, and all the circumstances which attend him, are the wise appointment of God; that man is a being of such

properties, that he is a moral agent, a proper subject of law ; that his moral actions are truly and entirely his own; as really so when they commence in early life, as afterwards ; that in perfect consistency with his dependence on God, he has all the properties which can belong to a created moral agent, and that his moral actions have all the properties which can make him justly responsible for them ; that they are as much his own acts, are as voluntary, as free, as deliberate, and involve as complete and unshackled an exercise of his intellectual and moral powers, as upon any other theory. Indeed, it appears perfectly clear to my mind, that there is no theory which makes so clear and perfect a distinction, as the Orthodox, between the actions of God and the actions of men, or between holiness and sin, or which gives so just and satisfactory a view of moral agency.

The other particular reason which Dr Ware suggests for the representation above referred to, is this ; that according to the Orthodox theory, the common grace granted to all is not sufficient to render it possible for them to become holy, the influence of the Spirit which is necessary to their sanctification being withheld.

On this I remark, first, that we assert the *possibility* of men's becoming holy, in every sense in which such possibility is necessary to the most perfect moral agency. We assert it in the plain, literal, proper sense. But there is a sense in which Dr Ware himself denies it to be possible that that should be, which God foreknows will not be. If he should here assert, what he often suggests, the final holiness and salvation of all men, the difficulty would still remain. For there are some men who are very sinful at present, and God knew they would be sinful ; and according to Dr Ware, p. 95, it is of course impossible for them to be otherwise than sinful. And yet he considers them moral agents, justly chargeable with the criminality of their conduct. Now we assert no impossibility of man's becoming holy, which is attended with any more difficulty in relation to the present subject, than that which Dr Ware asserts, and which every sober man must admit.

I remark, secondly, that it is not what is usually called the influence of the Spirit, or the grace of God, either common or special, that makes men capable of good and evil, and renders it righteous that God should punish them for their sins. They are made moral agents, and justly accountable for their actions, by the es-

sential attributes of their minds; by the rational and moral faculties which belong to them, as *human beings*. In consequence of God's giving them and continuing to them such minds, such rational and moral powers, it is proper that they should be placed under law, and recompensed according to their conduct. Whatever other favors are bestowed or withheld, men, in all circumstances and at all times, are fit subjects of moral government, while they possess those faculties which constitute them moral agents. We represent them as possessing all those faculties, and as being in circumstances which give to those faculties the most perfect exercise.

Before Dr Ware has done with this point, he repeats, perhaps the tenth or twentieth time, what I am sorry he ever repeated once; I mean that vulgar charge, which contains too much apparent truth to be directly denied, and yet too much falsehood to be admitted, namely, that we represent men to be as God made them, totally depraved, *incapable* of any good till renewed by *irresistible* influence,—irreversibly appointed to destruction without any regard to their sins, &c. I shall not stop to animadvert upon this. But there is one passage in the same paragraph, p. 126, on which I must detain the reader a moment. And I do it to show again, to what results Dr Ware is carried by his scheme of religion. He says; “if it is clear that God did not determine to regenerate men from any foresight of repentance and good works, it must be equally certain that he did not appoint the unregenerate to perish, from any foresight of their impenitence and sins.” The principle which is clearly implied in this passage, is, that those who are regenerate as really deserved regeneration for the good works they performed before regeneration, as those who are finally impenitent deserve to perish for their sins. God's foreknowledge and determination must correspond with facts, or regard things as they are. So that, if it is as certain that God determines to convert or save men from a foresight of their good works, as that he determines to destroy men from a foresight of their sins; then he does actually convert or save men as much from a regard to their good works, as he destroys men from a regard to their sins. And if God actually bestows the blessing as much on account of good works, as he inflicts the punishment on account of sins; it must be that the righteous are as really deserving of salvation, as the wick-

ed are of destruction. How this can be reconciled with the feelings of the humble Christian, with the common language of devotion, and with the strong and explicit declarations of the New Testament on the subject, I must leave to be made out by those who feel competent to the task.

At the close of the paragraph, p. 127, Dr Ware tells his readers, that my saying in one sentence that men are ordained to wrath *for their sins*, and in another, that the elect are chosen without any foresight of faith or good works as causes moving to the choice, is not the less inconsistent for having been stated by the Westminster Divines. I only add, that it is not the less consistent for that.

The views exhibited pp. 128—133, on the subject of means and privileges, are not, I think, such as can be defended. In my Reply, I had suggested that Dr Ware's position as to the sovereign appointment of men to privileges and means is attended with as great difficulties as the Orthodox doctrine. In his Answer, p. 128, he thus briefly states my reasoning; "If privileges are granted to some in distinction from others, which are designed to produce, and do in fact to a certain extent produce, a sanctifying influence upon their character; where is the difference, as to the general difficulty, between this, and the direct and immediate appointment to holiness itself?" He answers very decisively, "that the difference is the greatest possible; the one being entirely consistent, the other utterly inconsistent, with moral accountability." Suppose now the divine appointment in this case to be exactly correspondent with fact. Thus; God appoints that privileges shall be granted to some in distinction from others, and that to a certain extent those privileges shall in fact produce a sanctifying influence. God's appointment was that the thing should be just as it is. Does such a divine appointment make it otherwise than it is? And if the divine appointment makes the thing, and leaves it, as it is in fact, how is that appointment more inconsistent with moral accountability, than the thing itself? My opponents will allow, that if the divine *conduct* in any case is just and consistent, the divine *purpose* agreeing perfectly with that conduct, is equally just and consistent. In this case, some men's having distinguished privileges, which to a certain extent do really produce a sanctifying influence, that is, render men holy, is an in-

stance of the divine conduct. It is a fact in divine providence. The divine purpose is that this fact shall be just as it is, that is, that those very men shall be made holy, and be made holy in the very manner in which they are made so. The fact, by itself, is allowed to be consistent with moral accountability. Is it any the less so because it agrees with the divine purpose, or because God determined it should be just as it is? If any one supposes the divine purpose to be something not thus exactly agreeing with fact, he labors under a great mistake. And if he supposes, that the divine purpose is not as consistent with moral accountability and with every thing else, as the fact which perfectly corresponds with that purpose; this mistake is as great as the other.

I have allowed myself repeatedly to enlarge on this subject, perhaps beyond due bounds, because the Orthodox doctrine has appeared to me perfectly plain, and rational, and scriptural, and every way honorable to God, and I have been desirous of doing all in my power to clear away the mist which has invested it, and to bring others to view it with as perfect a conviction of its truth, and with as high enjoyment, as I do myself. I am the more desirous of this, because I have known too well the unhappiness of being pressed and agitated with the very difficulties, which lead my opponents to reject the doctrine.

Dr Ware, p. 85, refers to a passage in my Reply, p. 136, in which I acknowledge myself chargeable with a mistake. I said; "We cannot accede to Dr Ware's notion, that disciplinary *punishment* may be inflicted by a righteous and benevolent God, without real ill desert in those who suffer." The word *suffering* should have been used instead of *punishment*. On reading the observations of Dr Ware, I was surprised at my inadvertency; and the more so, because I had been used in my own reflections to mark the obvious distinction between *suffering* and *punishment*.

Dr Ware's attempt, pp. 153, 154, to point out the fallacy of the reasoning in my Reply, pp. 220, 221, has much plausibility; and I was ready to conclude on first attending to his remarks, that I had made a partial representation of his views. But a thorough examination has convinced me that my reasoning, with a little modification, is just and conclusive. Dr Ware had said; "Love to Christ will depend on our view of the nature and value of the benefits we receive through him, and not at all on the rank he

holds in the scale of being." This I represented as implying, that our love to Christ will be the same, both in kind and degree, whether he is possessed of mere *human* perfection, or of *divine* perfection; and this, as implying that *human* perfection is entitled to as high a regard, as *divine*. Dr Ware, in his Answer, endeavours to show that my reasoning is without any force, because it cannot be supposed that we receive the same benefits from man, or from any created being, as from God. It is obvious that my reasoning had no reference to the *benefits* received through Christ, which were mentioned by Dr Ware as the sole ground of our love to him, but merely to his unguarded assertion, that our love to Christ does not depend at all on the rank he holds in the scale of being. I should have pursued a more proper course, had I first admitted that the consideration of the benefits received from Christ is indeed of great importance in exciting our love, but that this is not the only thing concerned; that the consideration of his own personal excellence, or the rank he holds in the scale of being is also of great importance, and that denying this leads to such absurd consequences as I described. For if our love to Christ does not depend at all on his rank in the scale of being, then clearly, whether his rank be that of a man or a God, our love to him, so far as that rank is concerned, should be the same. It might be of special importance to show also, that the consideration of his own personal excellence, or his rank in the scale of beings, cannot be separated from the consideration of his benefits; as it would be absurd to suppose that any creature can bestow such benefits, as come from the Creator. But from a view of all which Dr Ware has written on the subject, I am led to think he did not mean, absolutely, that our love to Christ does not depend at all on his rank in the scale of being, but that it does not depend on this *primarily*, that this is not the *chief* consideration. Had he said this, my remarks would have been different, though I should still have thought the sentiment exceptionable.


But there is no end to controversy in this form; and I would rather my reasoning should be left in that awkward condition, in which it is made to appear in some of the minor criticisms of my antagonist, than to weary my readers and myself by extending my rejoinder to any greater length. I determined at the commence-

ment of these remarks, to confine myself to the discussion of those points, on which the decision of the controversy must depend. There are indeed hundreds of passages which I have not noticed, some on the practical influence of the two systems, some on the Atonement, and some on other points, which are, in my view, liable to strong objections. And I find it requires no small effort of self-denial and magnanimity, to leave all those passages without any remark, especially where I am satisfied I could easily make their weakness or absurdity visible to every reader.

In Dr Ware's last publication as well as in the former, there are many remarkable instances of fairness and candor in controversy, and many indications of sincerity and kindness, which I have noticed with great pleasure, and which cannot fail to excite feelings of personal respect and attachment towards him in the minds of all unprejudiced readers. But every new examination of the subject of controversy adds new strength to my conviction, that the system which he has labored so zealously to defend, is *radically erroneous*, and of *fatal tendency*, and that the system which he opposes, is the truth of God. The religious system set forth in his publications, and in the writings of the most respectable Unitarians in this country and in Europe, overlooks *the ruined state of man*. This is the grand, fundamental error of Unitarians. And we can have no expectation that they will accede to our views respecting the grace of God in redemption, the design of Christ's death, the work of the Holy Spirit, the eternal purpose of God respecting the extent of salvation, and other kindred doctrines of God's word, so long as they entertain such an opinion as they now do, of man's native purity and goodness. But if they should be feelingly convinced, as I hope through the mercy of God they will be, that all men are by nature totally sinful, and totally ruined, children of wrath, and that God would be perfectly just and holy should he leave them without exception to perish forever; they would have little difficulty in respect to the other doctrines which our system contains. This conviction of sin and ruin gives a fatal blow to pride and self-complacency; it leads to repentance and faith, and is the basis of evangelical religion. It must be obvious even to our opponents, that such a conviction necessarily involves the belief of the other doctrines with which it stands connected in our system. And it is

very obvious to us, that where this conviction is wanting, there will be a thousand difficulties and perplexities respecting the doctrines of Orthodoxy. The controversy appears, in this view, to be as much a matter of *feeling*, as of *reasoning*; and it ought to be treated accordingly.

Having now closed my remarks, I would bend the knee in earnest prayer to God, in behalf of myself and my opponent, that whatever is erroneous in our views of religion may be corrected; that whatever has been wrong in our mode of conducting this controversy may be forgiven; and that what we have both written may be made subservient to the cause of truth and love.



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